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ABSTRACT
We study two timing channel problems abstracted from practices of network
traffic analysis. The first timing channel exists in a router receiving packets
from two users; due to the sharing of router buffer, queuing delays of one
user’s packets incidentally convey information about the other user’s packet
arrival pattern. We demonstrate the feasibility of such a channel in reality
by devising a remote traffic analysis attack on home broadband users. In
particular, we implement a website detection attack that exploits a timing
side channel in the user’s DSL router, and show that adversaries can learn
sufficient information pertaining to the user’s activities on the web by sending
probes from a far-off vantage point.
To investigate performances of timing side channels in general systems
with a shared queue, we consider a job scheduler serving a regular user and
a malicious attacker, and quantify information leakage using a Shannon mu-
tual information based metric. Our analysis reveals the fundamental privacy
flaw of the class of deterministic work-conserving schedulers, such as longest-
queue-first (LQF), first-come-fist-serve (FCFS), and round robin; we show
that the attacker always learns half of a low-rate user’s arrival pattern. We
also study the usage of a shared queue for covert communication by consider-
ing a timing covert channel scenario, where one user of the scheduler encodes
a message in job-issuing times and the other user decodes this message from
job queuing delays. Formulating this as a conventional communication chan-
nel problem, we derive the channel capacities for common schedulers.
The second timing channel studied is the timing stenographic channel aris-
ing in network flow watermarking, a technique with applications in attacking
low-latency anonymous networks and detecting stepping stones. By injecting
an “invisible” timing pattern (namely the watermark) in a packet flow, one
can stealthily track the path of the flow in the network. Earlier flow water-
marking schemes mostly considered substitution errors, neglecting the effects
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of packet insertions and deletions that commonly happen within a network.
More recent schemes considered packet deletions but often at the expense of
the watermark visibility. We present an invisible flow watermarking scheme
capable of enduring a large number of packet losses and insertions. We
model the watermarking embedding/decoding processes as a timing steno-
graphic channel with dependent substitution, deletion and bursty insertion
errors, and propose a reliable watermark decoding scheme by formulating the
watermark decoding as an estimation problem. To maintain visibility, our
scheme embeds the watermark into inter-packet delays, as opposed to time
intervals including many packets. Experimental results on both synthetic
and real network traces demonstrate that our scheme is robust to network
jitter, packet drops and splits, while remaining invisible to an attacker.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Our communication content is for the most part protected by encryption and
authentication techniques. Oftentimes, however, the communication pattern,
such as timestamps and the size of messages, leaks important information
about the content. Traffic analysis is the practice of inferring sensitive in-
formation from the pattern of communications. Previous work has shown
that traffic analysis applied to network communications can be used to com-
promise both a network user’s privacy and anonymity, two major aspects
of our online confidentiality requirement. A large body of work has inves-
tigated attacks that extract communication contents from packet externals
in an intercepted flow (Figure 1.1(a)). By analyzing packet sizes, times, and
counts, it is possible to detect websites visited over an encrypted tunnel [1–4],
infer keystrokes sent over a secure interactive connection [5, 6] and even re-
cover phrases spoken in voice-over-IP (VoIP) sessions [7–9]. Other work has
studied linking multiple flows with correlated patterns, which produces in-
telligence to break the user’s anonymity. By detecting similar patterns in
packet externals, it is possible to track the path of a flow traversing the
network. The detected flow correlation can be used to match a user client
with the corresponding server, defeating anonymous communication systems
(Figure 1.1(b)) [10, 11].
In this dissertation, we consider traffic analysis using packet times, and
identify two topics pertaining to timing channels. Traditionally, timing chan-
nels have been studied primarily in the context of covert communication [12],
such as the CPU scheduling channel [13], where a sender process encodes a
message in the size of jobs and the recipient process decodes this information
from monitoring the CPU’s busy period, and the IP timing channel [14],
where secret messages are encoded in the inter-arrival-times of packets. In
the context of traffic analysis, two variants of the covert channel can be used
to model common attacks. The first one is a timing side channel that arises
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Figure 1.1: Traffic analysis attack scenarios.
in the side channel attack scenario of Figure 1.1(a), where an attack recov-
ers communication contents from the traffic pattern of an intercepted packet
flow. Unlike a covert channel, there is no active message sender in a side
channel. Instead, the user incidentally creates timing patterns, which can be
learned by a malicious attacker observing the user’s traffic.
Previous side channel attacks have been explored with restrict to a local
adversary who can observe the target traffic directly on a shared network
link or can monitor a wireless network from a nearby vantage point as in
Figure 1.1(a) [15]. We notice that a timing side channel also can be created
when the attacker does not directly see the user’s link, but shares a service
queue with the user, as illustrated by Figure 1.2, in which case the queueing
delays of the attacker’s traffic conveys information about the activities of
the user. This leads to an alternative traffic analysis approach available to
remote adversaries without direct traffic monitoring. In the case of a packet
router, it is possible to infer the state of a router’s queue through the observed
queuing delay of a probe packet. By sending frequent probes, the attacker can
measure dynamics of the queue and thus learn an approximation of the sizes,
timing, and counts of packets arriving at the router. For home broadband
2
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Figure 1.2: Timing channels in shared queues.
networks, in particular, DSL lines (containing a first-come-first-serve (FCFS)
queue), the attacker can send probe packets from a geographically distant
vantage point, located as far away as another country; the large gap between
the bandwidth of the DSL line and the rest of the Internet path makes
it possible to isolate the queuing delay of the “last-mile” hop from that
experienced elsewhere.
The first topic of this dissertation is timing channels in shared queues. To
demonstrate the information leakage of such channels in reality, we propose
remote traffic analysis and adapt the website fingerprinting attack [1, 2, 4],
previously targeted at local victims, to the remote scenario. Our website
detection attack can find out when a victim user under observation visits
a particular target site without directly monitoring the user’s traffic. This
would allow, for example, a company to find out when its employees visit its
competitors’ sites from their home computers or to deanonymize users of web
boards. The proposed remote traffic analysis is in fact applicable to any job
scheduling system, where information leakage occurs among users sharing a
queue. To extensively investigate the leakage behavior of common schedulers,
such as FCFS and round-robin (RR), we consider a timing side channel
problem in a two-user scheduler model where one user is malicious and wants
to infer the other’s arrival pattern. We quantify the leakage using Shannon’s
mutual information. Our analysis results reveal the privacy limitation of the
class of deterministic and work-conserving schedulers; the privacy leakage is
significant in the user’s low-arrival-rate region. Additionally, we formalize a
covert channel problem from the shared queue scenario in Figure 1.2, and
derive the channel capacity for common schedulers as well.
The second variant of covert channel is the timing stenographic channel.
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Figure 1.3: A timing channel in flow watermarking.
In a timing stenographic channel, the sender does not have full control of
event times seen by the receiver, unlike the case of a covert channel, but
can make “subtle” modifications to an existing overt process sent to the
receiver. The timing stenographic channel has previously been explored in
flow watermarking, an active flow linking technique [11,16–20]. As illustrated
in Figure 1.3, to track a user’s flow, the attacker actively injects a pattern
(the watermark) by modifying packet times so that it stays traceable along
the network path. The challenge of designing good flow watermarks is to keep
the injected pattern robust to network artifacts yet invisible to watermark
attackers.1 To avoid visible artifacts, individual inter-packet-delays (IPD)
(inter-arrival-time of successive packets) are frequently used for watermark
embedding [16,19]. The drawback, however, is that the watermark cannot be
decoded correctly if watermark bits get desynchronized as a result of packet
splits and drops during transmission. The second topic of this dissertation is
invisible and robust flow watermarks. We propose to embed the watermark
in IPDs. We model the watermarking procedure as a timing (stenographic)
channel with substitution, deletion, and bursty insertion errors, and develop
a reliable decoding scheme to retrieve watermark accurately in the face of
network jitter, packet drops and splits.
The main contributions of this dissertation are summarized in the follow-
ing:
1. Remote traffic analysis and website detection attack. We demon-
strate the information leakage of a shared queue in reality and show that
traffic analysis is a greater threat to privacy than previously thought by
introducing a new attack that can be carried out remotely. In particu-
1The goal of watermark attackers is to prevent the success of flow linking by disrupting
the detection or altogether removing the watermarks from the flow.
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lar, we show that, to perform traffic analysis, adversaries do not need
to directly observe the traffic patterns. Instead, they can gain sufficient
information by sending probes from a far-off vantage point that exploits
a timing side channel in the router queue. To demonstrate the threat
of such remote traffic analysis, we propose a remote website detection
attack that works against home broadband users, where the attacker
aims to find out whether a user browses a particular website, and its
privacy implications.
2. Quantifying information leakage through timing side channels
in schedulers. We develop an information-theoretic framework to
analyze timing side channels in common schedulers where information
leakage occurs due to a shared queue. We consider a server scheduling
jobs from an attacker and a regular user. The attacker, who wants
to learn the user’s job arrival pattern, chooses a time sequence as an
attack strategy to issue jobs and observes resulting departure times.
We measure the information leakage in this timing side channel by
Shannon’s mutual information between the user’s job arrival process
and the attacker’s job departure process.
3. Privacy-preserving properties of deterministic work-conserving
schedulers. We evaluate the privacy leakage in the class of determinis-
tic work-conserving (det-WC) schedulers, where the server takes deter-
ministic actions and stays busy as long as jobs are waiting in the queue.
We prove that the commonly used FCFS scheduler leaks the user’s
job arrival density and a longest-queue-first (LQF) scheduler leaks the
user’s arrival times completely. In an RR scheduler, the attacker does
not learn as much information as in the LQF scheduler, but a com-
plete leakage can still occur when the user’s job rate is low. We also
show that in the low-rate region a work-conserving version of TDMA
brings down the leakage by half, and all deterministic-work-conserving
schedulers leak at least half of the user’s arrival pattern. These results
demonstrate the potential power of our remote traffic analysis, and
also bring insights for designing mitigation strategies of side channel
leakage, for which intentional idling and injection of randomness of the
scheduler seem promising.
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4. Characterizing capacities of timing covert channels in shared
queues. We study a covert communication usage of the information
leakage in a shared scheduler, where one user of the scheduler encodes a
message in times of issuing jobs and the other user decodes the message
from queuing delays of its own jobs. Following conventional definitions
in information and coding theory, we derive the capacity of such a
timing covert channel when common queuing policies such as LQF and
FCFS are applied.
5. Invisible flow watermarks for channels with dependent sub-
stitution, deletion, and bursty insertion errors. We present an
invisible IPD-based flow watermarking scheme capable of enduring a
large number of packet losses and insertions. We model the watermark-
ing embedding/decoding processes as a timing stenographic channel
with dependent substitution, deletion and bursty insertion errors, and
propose a reliable watermark decoding scheme by formulating the wa-
termark decoding as an estimation problem. To maintain visibility, our
scheme embeds the watermark into inter-packet delays using a quan-
tization index modulation (QIM) framework [21], as opposed to time
intervals including many packets.
1.1 Organization of This Dissertation
In Chapter 2, we review some of the previous work on traffic analysis and
timing channels. In Chapter 3, we demonstrate the information leakage in
shared schedulers by a concrete remote traffic analysis attack. Inspired by
such an attack, we investigate two scenarios of constructing timing channels
in a shared queue. We start with the side channel scenario in Chapter 4,
where the scheduler is serving a legitimate user and a malicious attacker. We
then study the covert channel version of the problem in Chapter 5, where
two users, one sender and one receiver, collaborate to exchange secrets. In
Chapter 6, we describe how to design a flow watermarking scheme combatting
network jitter, packet drops and splits. We conclude in Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK
2.1 Traffic Analysis
The history of traffic analysis dates back to the early twentieth century, when
radio traffic analysis techniques were developed for military services with the
“purpose of gathering military information without recourse to cryptanal-
ysis” [22]. In World War I, the French first applied analysis of message
externals to learn information about the enemy. By analyzing the strength
of intercepted German radio signals, French analysts were able to identify
German radio stations, belonging to different high army commands, cavalry
units, corps, and infantry divisions, without reading the message text [23].
In modern computer security research, traffic analysis has been primarily
studied in the context of online privacy and anonymity. From the traffic pat-
tern, attackers are able to extract many details about users’ online activities.
When a user logs into remote terminals, the secure shell (SSH) protocol first
authenticates the user’s identity with a pass-phrase and encrypts all packets
transmitted subsequently [24]. Song et al. [5] showed that the inter-packet
timings however leaked the user’s pass-phrase, because every keystroke in
the interactive mode of SSH is transmitted in a single packet and there is
enough variability in timing patterns of typing different pass-phrases. Sim-
ilar attacks exploiting keystroke timing dynamics were dicussed in [10, 25],
and other work can be found that explored timing patterns of cryptographic
operations of the CPU processor to learn the secret key [26,27].
Side channel attacks have also been frequently applied on encrypted HTTP
traffic to attack web privacy. The idea is that packet externals including
size, count, and timing can leak sufficient information for inferring browsed
contents even when HTTP connection is encrypted (e.g., by the transport
layer security (TLS) protocol [28]). Yee first noticed that one could identify
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the particular page within a site accessed by the user by analyzing object
lengths (as related by Wagner and Schneier [29]). Chen et al. [3] applied this
observation to AJAX applications to recover detailed information about the
internal state of the application and user data. Cheng et al. [30] presented the
earliest implementation of website fingerprinting attack, where the attacker
profiles the HTTP traffic of different web pages and identifies the web page
browsed by a victim using a classifier built from collected profiles. The
classification features they used are object sizes and HTML file sizes.
Website fingerprinting in encrypted HTTP connections was studied first
by Hintz [31] and Sun et al. [32], with the object count also used as a clas-
sification feature. While Hintz did not present implementation details, Sun
et al. used a Jaccard’s coefficient based classifier to detect 75% of tested web
pages correctly. Instead of looking at web objects, Bissias et al. [1], Libera-
tore et al. [2], and Herrmann et al. [4] explored the statistical characteristics
of individual packets in HTTP traffic. Bissias et al. used packet sizes and
inter-arrival timings as classification features. However, their method is frag-
ile to the changes in the network environment, which affects the inter-arrival
timings. To avoid this problem, Liberatore et al. excluded inter-arrival tim-
ings from the classification features and implemented a Na¨ıve Bayes classifier
which worked efficiently in practice. Herrmann et al. further improved this
result using a Multinomial Na¨ıve Bayes classifier. Unlike aforementioned
schemes, which heavily relied on size information, Ling et al. [33] recently
presented a website fingerprinting attack solely using the round-trip time
(RTT) between the victim user and website hosts. Besides HTTP traffic,
side channel attacks have also been explored in other application protocols,
like VoIP [7–9].
Traffic analysis has also been applied to break user anonymity, for which
matching flows with similar patterns is important. Detecting correlated net-
work flows can be utilized to expose a stepping stone attacker who hides
behind proxy hosts or attack low-latency anonymous networks like Tor [34],
where anonymity is compromised once end flows are correctly matched. Since
network connections are often encrypted, it is infeasible to link flows directly
relying on packet contents. Packet timing, however, is a good feature for
matching encrypted flows [10, 35, 36]. Earlier work in flow matching was
based on long observation of flow characteristics, such as the number of
ON/OF periods [10]. Such passive techniques are fragile vis-a-vis network
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artifacts and require very long flows to avoid large false alarm rates.
Flow watermarking, an active approach, was suggested as an improvement.
In this approach, a pattern, the watermark, is injected into the flow with the
hope that the flow stays traceable after traversing the network as long as the
same pattern can be later extracted [11,16–20]. Unlike passive schemes, flow
watermarking is highly reliable and works effectively on short flows. Ear-
lier flow watermarks are of the inter-packet-delay (IPD) based type. Wang
et al. [16] proposed an IPD-based scheme that modulates the mean of se-
lected IPDs using the QIM framework. Watermark synchronization is lost
if enough packets are dropped or split. Therefore their scheme is unreli-
able in a real network. Another IPD-based scheme was presented in [19],
where watermarks were added by enlarging or shrinking the IPDs. This non-
blind scheme achieves some watermark resynchronizations when packets are
dropped or split, but is not scalable as the original packet flow is required
during decoding.
An alternative watermarking technique is interval based, where, instead of
using the IPDs between individual packets, the watermark pattern is encoded
into a batch of packets within fixed time intervals. In [11], an interval-
centroid scheme was proposed. After dividing the flow into time intervals
of the same length, the embedder created two patterns by manipulating the
centroid of packets within each interval. The modified centroids are not
easily changed even after packets are delayed, lost or split. A similar design
was presented in [18], where the watermark pattern was embedded in the
packet densities of predefined time intervals. One problem with interval-
based schemes is the lack of invisibility. Moving packets in batches generates
visible artifacts, which could expose the watermark positions. Based on
this observation, a multi-flow attack (MFA) was proposed in [37], which
showed that by lining up as few as 10 watermarked flows, an attacker can
observe a number of large gaps between packets (see Figure 10 in [37]) in the
aggregate flow, revealing the watermark positions. Recently, a new interval-
based scheme was proposed in [38], where locations of modified intervals were
made dependent with the flow pattern. This flow-dependent design reduces
the success rate of MFA, but also makes it more difficult to retrieve the
correct intervals for decoding in face of strong network noise. Moreover, the
perturbation introduced in the IPDs is large enough to make the scheme
susceptible to attacks such as BACKLIT [39].
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2.2 Timing Channels
Timing channels often refer to transmitting information on event times. Tra-
ditionally, timing channels are primarily studied in the context of covert
communication, namely covert channels. A large body of literature exists
investigating timing covert channels from both system and theory perspec-
tives. A CPU scheduling channel was studied in [13, 40], where one process
can signal messages covertly to another with a lower security level by modu-
lating the CPU’s busy periods. In [14], a covert channel over the IP network
was designed. The sender first synchronized an interval-based clock with the
receiver, and then signaled a message in the presence or the absence of a
packet within each interval. A myriad of covert channels using other media,
such as TCP timestamps and system storage, can be found in [41–46].
Wagner and Anantharam [47] presented a survey on the theory work of
covert timing channels. Some noteworthy contributions include analyzing
the communication capacity. Anantharam and Verdu´ [48] studied the tim-
ing channel between the arrival and departure process of a single user FCFS
queue, and showed that capacity is minimized when the service times of jobs
are exponentially distributed. A covert channel between two job processes
sharing a RR scheduler (e.g., CPU) was studied in [13, 40]. Assuming all
jobs have the same size, it was proved that the channel capacity can reach
log
(
1+
√
5
2
)
bits per time slot. Strategies for mitigating timing covert chan-
nels were studied in [49–54]. The main proposed countermeasure idea is to
weaken the correlation between event times seen by the sender and receiver
via injecting “dummy” delays.
In the practice of traffic analysis, two variants of covert channels can be
applied. The first variant of covert channel is the side channel, where the
source of information, the victim, is not collaborating with the recipient,
the attacker. A side channel can potentially be established as long as the
attacker shares certain resources with the victim. This is often the case
when a local adversary eavesdrops on the victim’s communication closely at
a local vantage point. The use of timing side channels in routers to infer
information about traffic at a remote location was first explored in previous
work in the context of anonymous communication networks. Murdoch and
Danezis [55] used a remote traffic analysis approach to expose the identity of
relays participating in a circuit in the Tor [56] and MorphMix [57] anonymous
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communication networks. Their approach was to send an on–off pattern of
high-volume traffic through the anonymous tunnel and a low-volume probe to
a router under test. If the waiting times of the probe showed a corresponding
increase during the “on” periods, the router was assumed to be routing the
flow. However, when Murdoch and Danezis evaluated their attack, the Tor
network was lightly loaded and consisted only of 13 relays; to repeat their
attack on today’s network, with around 2 000 relays and high traffic load,1
an attacker would need extremely large amounts of bandwidth to measure
enough relays during the attack window. Evans et al. [58] strengthened Mur-
doch and Danezis’s attack by a bandwidth amplification attack which makes
their attack feasible in modern-day deployment of Tor. Hopper et al. [59]
used a combination of Murdoch and Danezis’s approach and pairwise RTTs
between Internet nodes to correlate Tor nodes to likely clients. Chakravarty
et al. [60] proposed an attack for exposing Tor relays participating in a cir-
cuit of interest by modulating the bandwidth of an anonymous connection
and then using available bandwidth estimation to observe this pattern as it
propagates through the Tor network.
Like our remote traffic analysis approach, the aforementioned techniques
explored timing side channels arise in shared network resources. But they
relied on detecting a specially-crafted coarse-grained communication pattern,
whereas our attack makes use of fine-grained information obtained through
remote traffic analysis. In the era of cloud computing, timing side channels
are increasingly more perilous for traffic analysis as more of our daily activi-
ties move to networks where coupling of resources is inevitable. For example,
in the software-as-a-service cloud computing platform deployed by Amazon,
a server usually hosts jobs from several clients, which gives malicious clients
the chance of remotely probing workloads of neighbors [61].
Another variant of the covert channel problem is the stenographic chan-
nel, where two parities communicate secrets by embedding some pattern on
an overt traffic (the resulting artifacts should be small enough to hide the
existence of the channel). For instance, a JitterBug timing channel was pro-
posed where information was hidden in the inter-arrival times of packets [62].
The flow watermarking surveyed at the end of Section 2.1 is also a successful
application of a timing stenographic channel in traffic analysis.
1See http://torstatus.blutmagie.de (retrieved November 2010).
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CHAPTER 3
REMOTE TRAFFIC ANALYSIS
Traffic analysis attacks have been known to be effective for quite some time.
And yet, for most Internet users, they represent a minor concern at best.
Although a dedicated attacker could always intercept traffic by, say, bribing
a rogue ISP employee, or tapping a switch box, the attacker would run the
risk of being caught and potentially incurring criminal charges. In any case,
this level of effort seems justified only for highly sensitive material, rather
than casual snooping; therefore, as long as sensitive data is protected by
encryption or other techniques, a user may feel relatively safe.
We show, however, that traffic analysis can be carried out at a significantly
lower cost, and by attackers who never come into physical proximity with the
user. In fact, the attackers can launch their attacks from another state or
country, as long as they have access to a well-provisioned Internet connection.
This, in turn, is very easy to obtain due to the highly competitive Internet
hosting business sector: a virtual private server in a data center can cost
as little as a few dollars a month.1 We show that the attacker’s traffic has
very low rate, thus attackers do not need to incur high bandwidth costs.
Furthermore, users who are being spied upon are unlikely to notice the small
amount of performance overhead. Thus, anyone with a credit card2 can carry
out the attack and leave little trace.
3.1 Timing Side Channel in a DSL Line
We consider the following scenario as depicted in Figure 3.1. Alice is a home
user in Champaign, Illinois, browsing a website via her DSL Internet con-
nection. Her computer is connected to a broadband router, using a wireless
1See, for example, www.vpslink.com (retrieved February 2011).
2Working stolen credit cards are an easily acquired commodity on the black market [63].
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Figure 3.1: Remote traffic analysis on a DSL line.
or wired LAN connection.3 The router is connected via a DSL line to a
DSLAM4 or similar device operated by her ISP, which is then (eventually)
connected to the Internet. Unbeknown to Alice, Bob, who is located in an-
other state or another country wishes to attack Alice’s privacy. If Bob knows
Alice’s IP address (for example, if Alice visited a site hosted by Bob), he
can use his computer to send a series of ICMP echo requests (pings) to the
router in Alice’s house and monitor the responses to compute the round-trip
times (RTTs). One component of the RTTs is the queueing delay that the
packets experience at the DSLAM prior to being transmitted over the DSL
line; thus the RTTs leak information about the DSLAM queue sizes. This
leakage in turn reveals traffic patterns pertaining to Alice’s activities.
Since the probe packets traverse many Internet links, and the queuing
delays on Alice’s DSL link are but one component of the RTT, the question
is, how much information is leaked by this side channel? Furthermore, can
it be used to infer any information about Alice’s activities? To evaluate the
potential of this attack, we carried out a test on a home DSL link located
in Champaign, IL, USA. In the test, Alice opens a web page http://www.
yahoo.com on her computer. Simultaneously, Bob in Montreal, QC, Canada
sends a ping request every 10 ms to Alice’s home router. Figure 3.2(a) depicts
3In some cases, Alice’s computer might be connected to the DSL line directly.
4DSL access multiplexer.
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Figure 3.2: Ping experiment on a home DSL line in Champaign, IL.
the traffic pattern of Alice’s download traffic. The height of each peak in the
figure represents the total size of packets that are downloaded during each
10 ms interval. Figure 3.2(b) plots the RTTs of all Bob’s ping requests. We
can see a visual correlation between the traffic pattern and observed RTTs;
whenever there is a large peak in the user’s traffic, the attacker observes a
correspondingly large RTT.
3.2 Traffic Pattern Recovery
We now show how the attacker can analyze the information leaked through
this side channel. We model the incoming DSL link as a first-in-first-out
queue. As most traffic volume in an HTTP session occurs on the download
side, we will ignore the queuing behavior on the outgoing DSL link, though it
could be modeled in a similar fashion. Besides, we assume the DSLAM serves
packets at a constant service rate; i.e., the service time is proportional to the
packet size. As most HTTP packets are more than an order of magnitude
larger than ping packets, we ignore the service time for pings.
Assume that ith ping packet arrives in the queue at time ai, waits for the
router to serve all the packets currently in the router, and then departs at
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time di. Its RTT can be represented as:
RTTi =
∑
l∈links on path
qli + p
l
i + t
l
i, (3.1)
where qli, p
l
i, and t
l
i are the queueing, propagation, and transmission delays
incurred by the ith ping packet on link l, respectively. Note that the prop-
agation and transmission delays are mostly constant, and in fact we can
approximate: ∑
l∈links on path
pli + t
l
i ≈ min
j
RTTj, (3.2)
since Bob is likely to experience near-zero queueing delays for some of the
pings. Furthermore, as argued in Section 3.1, the queueing delay on links
other than the DSL line are going to be minimal, thus we can further ap-
proximate:
RTTi ≈ min
j
RTTj + (di − ai). (3.3)
Making use of the queuing delay di − ai from (3.3), the attacker Bob can
further infer the total size of HTTP packets arriving during the interval
[ai−1, ai]’s. For this purpose, two cases need to be considered.
1. ai ≥ di−1. In this case, when the ping request packet enters the queue,
the DSLAM is either idle or serving packets destined for Alice. The
delay di − ai reflects the time required to finish serving the HTTP
packets currently in the buffer, and is thus approximately proportional
to the total size of Alice’s arrivals during the interval [ai−1, ai].
2. ai < di−1. In this case, the previous ping request is still in the queue
when the current request arrives. The router can start to serve packets
that arrived in the interval [ai−1, ai] only after di−1, when the previous
ping reply is sent. Thus the delay di−di−1 is the service time for those
packets and can be used to recover the total size.
Algorithm 1 summarizes the traffic pattern recovery procedure based on
the above analysis, where tping is the interval between successive ping re-
quests. To account for minor queueing delays experienced on other links,
we define a threshold η such that RTT variations smaller than η are consid-
ered noise and do not correspond to any packet arrival at the DSLAM. The
resulting time sequence {sˆi} is the traffic pattern learned by the attacker.
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Algorithm 1 Traffic pattern recovery algorithm
1: let d0 = 0
2: for i = 1 to the probe sequence length do
3: # reconstruct the arrival and departure times using the ping interval
4: ai = tping · i
5: di = RTTi −RTTmin + ai
6: # estimate the total size of packets arriving in [ai−1, ai]
7: ŝi = di −max {di−1, ai}
8: # discard noise
9: if ŝi < η then
10: ŝi = 0
11: end if
12: end for
Figure 3.2(c) plots the recovered traffic pattern using the RTTs in Fig-
ure 3.2(b). After processing, the resulting time series proportionally ap-
proximate the packet size sequence of the original traffic in Figure 3.2(a).
As shown Section 3.3, it can be applied to infer more sensitive information
about Alice’s activities, e.g., website fingerprinting. Note that in the afore-
mentioned Case 1, the attacker may underestimate the size of the HTTP
packets arriving in the period [ai−1, ai] because a portion of them will have
already been served by time ai. The error depends both on the frequency of
the probes and the bandwidth of the DSL link. Since most HTTP packets
are of maximal size (MTU), we can ensure that all such packets are observed
by setting the ping period to be less than: MTU
DSL bandwidth
. Thus the adversary
must tune the probe rate based on the DSL bandwidth and faster links will
require a higher bandwidth overhead (but the pings will form a constant,
small fraction of the overall DSL bandwidth).
3.3 Website Detection Attack
Previous work on traffic analysis has shown that it is often possible to iden-
tify the website that someone is visiting based on traffic timings and packet
sizes [1, 2, 4], namely, website fingerprinting. As compared with previous
work, using our remote traffic analysis technique for identifying websites in-
troduces two additional challenges. First, previous work used fine-grained
information like exact packet size distributions to create features, whereas in
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our setting this information is not available directly, since the queueing side
channel produces only approximate sums of packet sizes. Since it is hard to
infer information about each single packet from our recovered pattern time
series, we use the entire time series, which contains the estimated size of all
HTTP packets downloaded during each probe period, to create one finger-
print trace. Identification of websites is based on the similarity between the
observed fingerprints and samples in the training set.
The challenge is to find a meaningful distance metric between fingerprint
traces. Note that pointwise comparisons will produce poor results. This is
because parts of the fingerprint may be impacted by the noise from a small
queueing delay on a core Internet link. Additionally, the fingerprint could
miss some packets contained in the original traffic due to pattern recovery
errors. Finally, even fingerprints of the same website are not strictly synchro-
nized in time due to the inter-packet delay variations. To deal with these
issues, we turn to the Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) distance [64].
DTW was developed for use in speech processing to account for the fact
that when people speak, they pronounce various features of the phonemes at
different speeds, and do not always enunciate all of the features. DTW at-
tempts to find the best alignment of two time series by creating a non-linear
time warp between the sequences. Figure 3.3 visualizes the DTW-based dis-
tance between two time series: X = {x1, x2 . . . , xI} and Y = {y1, y2 . . . , yJ}.
Let function F (z) = {z(1), . . . , z(K)} be a mapping from series X to series
Y where z(k) = (x(i), y(j)). For every pair of matched points based on the
mapping, we define the distance as d(z(k)) = d(i, j) = |xi − yj|. The final
distance between the X and Y can then be defined as a weighted and normal-
ized sum over all matched point pairs as D(X, Y ) = minF
{∑K
k=1 d(z(k))w(k)∑K
k=1 w(k)
}
.
The weights w(k)’s are flexible parameters picked based on the specific appli-
cation scenario. Applying dynamic programming, one can find the warping
function with minimum distance, which captures the similarity between the
two time series under best matched alignment.
In our attack, we apply DTW-based distance to account for the estimation
errors and time desynchronizations in fingerprints. Based on the distances
with the training data set, the attacker will know if a test sample indicates
the activity that the user browsed the website of interest.
Second, previous work created a training set from the same vantage point
that was then used for fingerprinting tests. An attacker performing remote
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Figure 3.3: Warping function in DTW.
traffic analysis must, of course, use a different environment for collecting
the training set, potentially affecting the measured features. To obtain an
accurate training fingerprint for a particular user’s traffic, the attacker must
be able to replicate the network conditions on that user’s home network.
The approach we use is to set up a virtual machine running a browser that
is connected to the Internet via a virtual Dummynet link [65]. The virtual
machine is then scripted to fetch a set of web pages of interest; at the same
time, an outside probe is sent across the Dummynet link, simulating the
attack conditions on a real DSL link.
We found that the most important parameter for the attacker to replicate
was the link bandwidth. First, as discussed in Section 3.2, the probe fre-
quency should be adjusted based on the link bandwidth. Bandwidth also
affects the magnitude of observed queuing delays. Additionally, it can sig-
nificantly alter the traffic pattern itself, as TCP congestion control mecha-
nisms are affected by the available bandwidth. Fortunately, estimating the
bandwidth on a link is a well-studied problem [66–68]. In our tests, we use
a packet-train technique by sending a burst of probe packets and measur-
ing the rate at which responses are returned. Since most DSL lines have
asymmetric bandwidth, we used TCP ACK packets with 1000 data bytes to
measure the download bandwidth on the link. The target would send a short
TCP reset packet for each ACK that it received, with the spacing between
resets indicating the downstream bandwidth; we found this method to be
fairly accurate.
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3.3.1 Attack Scenarios
We can first consider the classic website fingerprinting scenario: Bob obtains
traces from Alice’s computer by sending probes to her DSL router and com-
pares them to fingerprints of websites that he has generated, in order to learn
about her browsing habits. Note that this can be seen as a classification task:
each web request in Alice’s trace is classified as belonging to a set of sites.
This scenario has been used in most of the previous work on website finger-
printing, but it introduces the requirement that Bob must know the set of
potential sites that Alice may visit. Without some prior information about
Alice’s browsing habits, this potential set includes every site on the Internet,
making it infeasible to generate a comprehensive set of fingerprints. One
could create fingerprints for popular sites only, but this reduces the accuracy
of the classification task [4, 32, 69]. For example, the top 1 000 United State
sites, as tracked by Alexa, are responsible for only 56% of all page views,
therefore, even a perfect classifier trained on the 1 000 sites would give the
wrong result nearly half the time.5
We therefore consider a different scenario, where Bob wants to detect
whether Alice visits a particular site. For example, if Bob is Alice’s employer,
he may wish to check if she is considering going to work for Bob’s competitor,
Carol. To carry out this attack, Bob would create a fingerprint for Carol’s
jobs site; he would then perform a binary classification task on Alice’s traffic,
trying to decide whether a trace represents a visit to the target site or some
other site on the Internet. As we will see, such binary classification can be
performed with relatively high accuracy for some choices of sites. Note that,
as Alice’s employer, Bob has plenty of opportunities to learn information
about Alice’s home network, such as her IP address, browser and operat-
ing system versions, and download bandwidth, by observing Alice when she
connects to a password-protected Intranet site, and can therefore use this
information to create accurate training data for building fingerprints.
As another example, Bob may be trying to identify an employee who makes
posts to a web message board critical of Bob.6 Bob can similarly build pro-
5In fact, the situation is even worse, since Alexa counts all page views within a certain
top-level domain, whereas fingerprints must be created on each individual URL.
6This example is motivated by several actual cases of companies seeking to do this;
see https://www.eff.org/cases/usa-technologies-v-stokklerk and https://www.
eff.org/cases/first-cash-v-john-doe.
19
files, tailored for each employee’s home computer, of the web board and
perform remote traffic analysis. He can then correlate any detected matches
to the times of the posts by the offending pseudonym; note that this de-
anonymization attack is able to tolerate a significant number of false posi-
tive and false negative errors by combining observations over many days to
improve confidence [70].
3.3.2 Evaluation
We next present our results of website detection attack. First, through mea-
surements of DSL probe variances, we demonstrate the feasibility of the
RTT-based remote traffic analysis, which is the basis of our attack.
Measurement of DSL Probe Variance: To further confirm that the
fluctuations of the user’s RTTs are primarily determined by the congestion
at the DSL link, we conducted a small Internet measurement study. We
harvested IP addresses from access logs of our lab server. We noted that many
DSL providers assign a DNS name containing “dsl” to customers. Using
reverse DNS lookups, we were able to locate 918 potential DSL hosts. To
determine each host’s suitability for measurement, we first determine if it
responds to ping requests. We then use traceroute to locate the hop before
the target DSL host (e.g., the DSLAM). Next, we ensure this previous hop
also responds to ping requests. Finally, we measure the minimum RTT of
several hundred ping probes. We exclude any host with a minimum RTT
of greater than 100 ms to bound the study to hosts in a wide geographical
area around our Montreal, Canada probe server. Using this method, we
identified 189 DSL hosts to measure.7 The measurement consists of sending
ping probes every 2 ms for 30 seconds to the target DSL host and then to
its previous hop. We collected these traces in a loop over a period of several
hours.
We found that, on average, the target host RTT was ∼10 ms greater than
the previous hop. We frequently observed the pattern in Figure 3.4(a) where
the previous hop RTT was very stable and target RTT had variations greater
7This number is underestimated as many of the IPs on our server log already became
out-of-date (the hosts hooked went oﬄine) by the time of our ping tests. A more accurate
number can be obtained if a list of valid DSL IPs is provided in real time.
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Figure 3.4: Measurement of DSL probe variances.
than 10 ms. We then measured the span between the 95th percentile and the
minimum observation in each sample. Figure 3.4(b) shows the CDFs of this
data for the each target DSL host and its previous hop from the measurement
set. We see that the previous hop RTT span shows more stability than the
end host, confirming one of the primary assumptions of our work.
Attack Setups and Data Collection: We built a DSL-Setup consisting
of a target system and a ping server. The target system captured the real
environment of a home user. It ran on a laptop, located in Champaign,
Illinois, connected to a DSL line with 3 Mbps download and 512 Kbps upload
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speeds. On the laptop, we used a shell script to automatically load websites
using Firefox 4.0.8 The ping server was a commercial hosting system, located
in Montreal, QC, Canada, acting as the remote attacker. It was scripted to
send pings at precise time intervals with hping.9 and record ping traces with
tcpdump10 We set the ping interval to 2 ms.
To emulate the attacker’s training procedure, we also built a VM-Setup, a
VMware ESX host testbed located in our lab. On this machine, we ran several
VMware guest operating systems: a Ubuntu VM Client, a virtual router and
a host implementing a transparent Dummynet link. The Ubuntu VM Client
acted as a virtual target, and was scripted to browse websites using Firefox,
similar to the real home user. The virtual router provided NAT service for the
client, and was connected to the Internet through the Dummynet link. The
Dummynet bridge was configured to replicate the network conditions of the
target DSL link (i.e., the bandwidths). As in the DSL-Setup, we sent probes
from another host outside the constrained Dummynet link to the virtual NAT
router periodically. The attacker then collected training fingerprints while
the virtual client was browsing websites through this virtual DSL link. Note
the virtual router and ping host were connected to the same dedicated high-
speed LAN minimizing the impact of additional noise added by intermediate
routers or network congestion caused by other hosts.
We collected fingerprints of the front pages for 1000 websites on the top list
on Alexa.11 For websites which have multiple mirrors in different countries
like http://www.google.com, we only considered the site with the highest
rank. We excluded websites with extremely large loading time (greater than
60 s). For each website, we collected 12 fingerprint samples from both the
DSL and VM setups. The delay between collecting two samples is half an
hour. Following the same assumptions in previous papers [2,4], the browsers
were configured appropriately (no caching, no automatic update checks and
no unnecessary plugins). This makes our results comparable with previous
work.
Website Detection: We first analyze the ability of an attacker to detect
whether a user visits a particular site. To do so, the attacker checks whether
8http://www.mozilla.com/firefox/.
9http://www.hping.org.
10http://www.tcpdump.org.
11http://www.alexa.com.
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the distance between the user trace and the target website is smaller than
some threshold, and if so, the website is considered detected. This is a binary
classification task and its performance can be characterized by the rates
of false positives—a different website incorrectly identified as the target–
and false negatives–the target website not being identified. The choice of
threshold ν creates a tradeoff between the two rates: a smaller threshold will
decrease false positives at the expense of false negatives.
To estimate false positive rate given a particular threshold ν, we fix a
target site w and use the 12 samples T = {sw,1, . . . , sw,12} as the training
set. We use the samples from the other sites as a test set; i.e., U = {si,j} for
i 6= w, j ∈ {1, . . . , 12}. Given a sample si,j ∈ U , we calculate the minimum
distance from it to the training samples:
dw(si,j) = min
k
D(si,j, sw,k), (3.4)
where D(·, ·) is the DTW-based distance function defined in Section 3.3. We
then consider every sample si,j ∈ U such that dw(si,j) < ν to be a false
positive and therefore estimate the false positive rate:
pˆw =
|{si,j ∈ U |dw(si,j) < ν}|
|U | . (3.5)
To estimate the false negative rate, we pick one of the sample sw,i and
calculate its minimum distance to the other 11 samples sw,j, j 6= i, and count
it as a false negative if the distance is at least ν. We then repeat this process
for each i = 1, . . . , 12:
qˆw =
|{sw,i|i ∈ {1, . . . , 12},minj 6=i d(sw,i, sw,j) ≥ ν}|
12
. (3.6)
Given a target false positive rate, p∗w, we can calculate the threshold ν
∗
w
that would ensure pw < p
∗
w. Note that because pˆw is only an estimate of pw,
we calculate a 95% confidence interval (CI) for pw and chose ν such that the
upper limit of the CI is below p∗w.
12 Note that this threshold will be different
for each site. We can then estimate the corresponding false negative rate qˆ∗w
that corresponds to ν∗w.
12We use a binomial proportion confidence interval here. This is slightly imprecise, as
the 12 · 999 samples are not independent; we leave computation of confidence intervals
that take this into account for future work.
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Figure 3.5: Number of sites with a given false negative rate or smaller.
The target false positive rate will largely depend on the prior knowledge
the attacker has. Typically, we will want to aim for a small false positive
rate, since even if Bob considers it likely that Alice does in fact visit the
target site w at some point, most of the web browsing in any trace will still
be to other sites; thus a low false positive rate is needed for the test to have
high positive predictive value. On the other hand, Bob can easily tolerate a
moderate false negative rate, since even if he only finds out about employees
searching for other jobs 90%, or even 50% of the time, this information is
useful nevertheless. Likewise, perfect detection is not needed for the potential
attack to have a chilling effect on Alice’s behavior.
Figure 3.5 shows the false negative rates that can be achieved given a target
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false positive rate below 0.5%, 1%, and 5%. Each bar represents a cumulative
number of websites, i.e., websites for which qˆ∗w is at or below the x-axis value.
We show two sets of results; one using the VM-Setup for training and DSL-
Setup for testing (Figure 3.5(a)) and one using the DSL samples for both
training and test data sets (Figure 3.5(b)). Note that there is a significant
difference between the two graphs, resulting from the discrepancies between
the simulated (VM) and the test environment. We expect that, with some
work, an attacker may be able to reduce such discrepancies by more carefully
tuning the parameters of the virtual machine and the simulated link, or
by using actual hardware and a real DSL line that mimics Alice’s setup.
The DSL–DSL case therefore shows the limits of what can be achieved by
improving the training environment.
An important observation is that, in both cases, the success of the web
detection is highly dependent on the target site. For a small number of sites—
75 in the VM–DSL case and 320 in the DSL–DSL case—the web detection
attack works very well: we are able to maintain a very low false positive
rate of 0.5% while experiencing few false negatives (17% or below). On the
other hand, some sites are virtually invulnerable to our attack: for 65 of the
sites we tested, we were unable to observe any true positives with a target
false positive rate of 5% (i.e., qˆ∗w = 100%), even in the best-case DSL–DSL
scenario. We found these sites to have either very short traces, making it
difficult to distinguish them from other such sites, or highly variable traffic
patterns due, for example, to dynamic content, making it difficult to create
a useful fingerprint. Note the attacker can predict false positive rates for
different websites ahead of time using experiments carried on VM setups.
Making use of this knowledge would make the attack even stronger.
De-anonymization: We next consider the de-anonymization attack de-
scribed in Section 3.3.1. As a case study, we considered the site http:
//www.warriorforum.com, a popular Internet marketing forum. It uses the
vBulletin software, which was, as of August 2011, the most popular bulletin
board software,13 and thus should be representative of a number of other
sites. In our attack scenario, Bob wishes to find out if Alice is using a par-
ticular pseudonym (say, “diane123”) to post on the site. To accomplish this,
he first collects traces from Alice’s home computer for a period of time. He
13http://www.big-boards.com/statistics/.
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then waits for posts to the forum from “diane123” and performs a detection
attack to see if Alice was visiting the site at the time of post. Repeated
successful matches can then be used to obtain increasing confidence in tying
Alice to “diane123”.
Note that Bob will need to build a profile that targets internal pages of
www.warriorforum.com, rather than the front page. Alice’s post requests
will be too small to create an easily observable feature; however, vBulletin
displays the forum thread after a post has been made. Therefore, Bob can
collect samples visiting threads where “diane123” has posted to create a
fingerprint. Note that, in this attack, fingerprint creation happens after the
trace collection. A problem facing Bob is that different post pages on Warrior
Forum will have similar features in their RTT profile. A match, therefore,
can show that Alice visited some Warrior Forum page with high confidence,
but it may not have been the correct thread. Even this information, how-
ever, is likely to be enough for de-anonymization. For example, Alexa shows
that fewer than 1% of United State Internet users actually visit the Warrior
Forum, and those that do tend to stay on the site less than 10 minutes on
average. If we make the simplifying assumptions that these visits are dis-
tributed randomly across a three-hour evening period, the additional false
positive rate due to random visits to other Warrior Forum pages is no more
than 6%, even if Alice is known to be a Warrior Forum user. Combining
observations across several posts allows Bob to improve his confidence.
Over a long term, even simpler attacks may suffice: since most people’s
Internet usage is bursty, simply observing that Alice always actively used
the Internet in some way whenever “diane123” made posts can be used for
de-anonymization [70]. Likewise, Bob may be able to rule out Alice as a
suspect if she was known to be at home (due to recent DSL activity) but her
connection was idle at the times of the target posts.
Finally, Bob may be able to use the similarity between internal forum pages
to his advantage. In particular, suppose that Alice publicly participates in
the forum under her real identity, in addition to potentially posting under a
pseudonym. Bob can use the times of Alice’s posts under her real name to
label traces collected from Alice’s computer and create a training set. In this
case, Bob does not need to simulate Alice’s computing environment as the
training and test environments are exactly the same—the ideal conditions
we used in the DSL–DSL case. To study this attack, we collected samples
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Figure 3.6: Detection performance for Warrior Forum when training with
the correct post page and when using other pages.
from 100 different posts on the Warrior Forum site. For each sample, we
attempt to match it to a fingerprint created from the other 99 posts; our
process is similar to (3.6), except using a different threshold for each sample.
From this, we estimate the false negative rate for a given target false pos-
itive rate, calculated using (3.5), using the traces from 999 other websites.
Figure 3.6 shows the results. The use of different pages to test degrades
the matching performance, but it still provides sufficient detection power for
de-anonymization after a few posts.
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CHAPTER 4
TIMING SIDE CHANNELS IN SHARED
QUEUES
The remote traffic analysis presented in Chapter 3 can be generalized to
any scheduling system serving multiple users, where a timing side channel
arises due to the sharing of queue. In this chapter, we analyze the privacy
leakage via timing side channels in a series of common schedulers, from an
information-theoretic aspect.
4.1 Preliminaries
We first introduce our notation and system model. Throughout this chapter:
bold script A denotes the infinite sequence {A1, A2, · · · }, An denotes the
finite sequence {A1, A2, · · · , An}, and Aji the sequence {Ai, Ai+1, · · · , Aj},
where j ≥ i.
We consider the timing side channel in a scheduler processing jobs from
a regular user and a malicious attacker in discrete time, as depicted by Fig-
ure 4.1. In each time slot, the user (and the attacker) either issues one job
or remains idle. All jobs have the same size and take one time slot to ser-
vice. We assume that the user sends jobs according to a Bernoulli process
with rate λ. Note that the difficulty in learning the user’s arrival pattern
depends on the unpredictability of the pattern. It is easier for the attacker
to learn the arrival pattern of the user if the user issues jobs in a predictable
or regular pattern such as ON/OFF traffic with a fixed period. On the other
hand, the Bernoulli process is quite unpredictable as it is the maximum en-
tropy discrete time stationary process for a fixed arrival rate (a similar result
for Poisson arrivals can be found in [71]). The attacker, who wants to infer
the user’s arrival times, picks time slots according to his attack strategy and
sends jobs with the long term rate ω, not exceeding 1−λ, in order to preserve
the queue’s stability. Unlike in a denial of a service attack, in a side channel
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Figure 4.1: A scheduler services jobs from two arrival processes; one from a
malicious attacker (solid) and one from a regular user (blank).
attack, the attacker does not benefit from overloading the server which re-
sults in dropping packets and hence losing information. We assume all arrival
and departure events occur at the beginning of time slots.
4.1.1 Information Leakage Metric
We measure information leakage in this timing side channel by Shannon’s
mutual information between the user’s arrival process and the attacker’s
observations, comprised of his arrival and departure times. Similar met-
rics, e.g., Shannon’s equivocation, have been frequently used for quantifying
information leakage in communication systems, such as the wiretap chan-
nel [72]. Denote the arrival event sequence of the user’s jobs in each time
slot by δ = {δ1, δ2, · · · }, where δi ∼ Bernoulli(λ), i ∈ Z, and denote the
arrival and departure times of the attacker’s jobs by A = {A1, A2, · · · } and
D = {D1, D2, · · · }, respectively.
Definition 1. The information leakage of a timing side channel in a queue
shared by a user and an attacker is defined as
L(λ) = max
A: lim
k→∞
k
Ak
<1−λ
lim
n→∞
I (δn; Am,Dm)
n
, (4.1)
where I (·; ·) denotes Shannon’s mutual information, λ is the user’s arrival
rate, and m is the number of jobs the attacker has issued by time n:
m = sup{k : Ak ≤ n}. (4.2)
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The leakage L characterizes the information gain of the attacker deploying
the best possible attack strategy satisfying the rate restriction. Hence, a
larger leakage L signifies a larger compromise in the user’s privacy through
the timing side channel. Let H(λ) denote the entropy rate of the user’s
arrival process, which is assumed to be Bernoulli.
Definition 2. The information leakage ratio of a timing side channel in a
queue shared by a user and an attacker is defined as
R(λ) = max
A: lim
k→∞
k
Ak
<1−λ
lim
n→∞
I (δn; Am,Dm)
nH (λ)
. (4.3)
The information leakage ratio R is a better metric for comparing the leak-
age across users with various rates. The value of L (and R) clearly depends
on the scheduling policy. For instance, for the TDMA policy, in which fixed
time slots are preassigned for serving each arrival process, both L and R
are zero. This is because service times of the attacker’s jobs are statistically
independent of the user’s arrival pattern. Unfortunately, TDMA is wasteful
and adds significant delays by causing the scheduler to idle. Therefore, such
complete isolation of users’ job processes is often not desired in practice. In
this work, we analyze the information leakage of timing channels in work-
conserving (delay-optimal) schedulers and investigate whether good policies
that are simultaneously privacy and delay optimal exist.
4.1.2 Summary of Results
In the rest of this chapter, we characterize or derive bounds on the leakage
in the class of deterministic work-conserving (det-WC) schedulers. These
schedulers service jobs in a deterministic fashion and do not idle as long as
there are jobs in the queue. Our main results are summarized in Figure 4.2.
We show that even when the attacker is required to send packets of a
comparable size to the user, all det-WC schedulers leak at least half of the
user’s traffic pattern in the low-rate region. This is proved by deriving a
universal lower bound for all det-WC schedulers as depicted by the red dashed
curve in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Information leakage ratios in the class of det-WC schedulers.
The attacker learns completely the arrival process of the user in an LQF
scheduler by simply maintaining his own queue length at one (the flat solid
line at the top in Figure 4.2). In an FCFS scheduler, instead of the exact
arrival times, the attacker can infer the number of jobs (arrivals) of the
user between any of his two consecutive jobs by sampling the queue at his
maximum rate. This leads to a severe leakage in the arrival process of a
user with low arrival rate (the blue solid curve in Figure 4.2), as the attacker
can sample the queue frequently enough to obtain an accurate estimate of
the user’s arrival event in each time slot. We derive a lower bound on the
privacy leakage for round robin (the green dashed curve in Figure 4.2), which
can be achieved by an attacker who issues a new job right after his previous
job is serviced. This attack strategy allows the attacker to detect when the
user’s queue gets empty. As depicted in Figure 4.2, it provides sufficient
information about the user’s arrival pattern at the low-rate region, resulting
in a complete information leakage when the user’s arrival rate λ→ 0.
The near-complete information leakage in the low-rate region is alleviated
by the work-conserving TDMA (WC-TDMA) scheduler. Like TDMA, the
WC-TDMA scheduler reserves slots for each arrival process; e.g., odd slots
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for the user and even ones for the attacker. However, in each time slot, if
the preassigned user has no jobs, the scheduler serves the other user with
jobs waiting for service. Such work-conserving behavior enables the attacker
to correctly detect arrivals on time slots reserved by the user. We derive a
lower bound on the leakage of a WC-TDMA scheduler, which is proved to
be tight when the user’s rate λ→ 0 (the orange dashed curve in Figure 4.2).
This means the attacker can learn the arrival pattern of a low-arrival-rate
user perfectly for half of the time, and further implies that for λ → 0, WC-
TDMA is a privacy optimal policy in the det-WC class as it meets the det-WC
universal lower-bound.
4.2 Longest-Queue-First
We first analyze the leakage of an LQF scheduler, which we can exactly
characterize. In each time slot, the LQF scheduler services the first buffered
job from the user that has more jobs queued up so far. In the case of a tie,
the scheduler serves a predetermined user first.
Since the LQF scheduler takes actions by comparing queue lengths of users,
a smart attacker can accurately learn the change in the user’s queue state
by maintaining his queue length constantly at one. Assuming the user has
priority of service at a tie, such an attacker always knows whenever the user’s
queue size passes 0 and detects every job sent by the user, as further explained
below.
Theorem 4.2.1. Information leakage of an LQF scheduler serving a user
and an attacker is given by
LLQF (λ) = H(λ), (4.4)
where λ is the user’s arrival rate. Consequently, RLQF (λ) = 1, for all 0 <
λ < 1.
Proof. Consider a nonstop monitoring attack strategy (Figure 4.3), where the
attacker issues a new job immediately after his previous is serviced. Recall
in our model, all arrival and departure events happen at the beginning of
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Figure 4.3: Nonstop monitoring: the attacker issues a new job right after a
previous job departs from the queue.
time slots. Thus, in the nonstop monitoring attack, we have
Ak = Dk−1, k ∈ Z. (4.5)
Such an attacker always has a single job in the queue. Assume the user
gets served first when a tie happens. Then, the scheduler never serves the
attacker unless the user has no job left. As a result, whenever the user issues
a new job, the attacker experiences a time slot of delay, i.e.,
δi =
0 if ∃k ∈ Z, s.t. Dk = i+ 11 otherwise , i ∈ Z. (4.6)
Similarly if the attacker has priority of service when there is a tie in queue
lengths, he would get served if and only if the user’s queue length falls below
2, in which case (4.6) also holds.
Therefore, we can obtain a lower bound on information leakage which
results from the nonstop-monitoring attack as follows:
LLQF (λ) ≥ lim
n→∞
I (δn; Am,Dm)
n
(a)
= lim
n→∞
I (δn; Dm)
n
= H(λ)− lim
n→∞
H (δn|Dm)
n
(b)
= H(λ),
(4.7)
where (a) and (b) follow from (4.5) and (4.6), respectively. Additionally,
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since the leakage is always upper-bounded by the total entropy rate of the
user’s arrival process, H(λ), we have LLQF (λ) = H(λ).
LQF is a low-complexity approximation of the MaxWeight scheduling, a
throughput-optimal algorithm applied in network switches [73]. It requires
less buffer storage than other common scheduling algorithms, such as FCFS
and round robin [74]. However, as seen in Theorem 4.2.1, LQF fully exposes
arrival pattern of the user to an attacker.
4.3 First-Come-First-Serve
We subsequently analyze the leakage of FCFS, a simple service policy widely
applied in network systems. At each time slot, the FCFS scheduler services
the job at the head of the queue.1 FCFS reveals the queue length q(·) of the
buffer to an attacker through queueing delays of his jobs because
q (Ak) = Dk − Ak − 1, k ∈ Z, (4.8)
where “1” accounts for the service time of the kth attacker’s job. As a result,
the attacker can frequently sample the state of the buffer queue and then
estimate the number of the user’s arrivals.
Let N(t) denote the counting function associated with the user’s arrivals
at time t, then
N(t) =
t∑
j=1
δj, t ∈ Z. (4.9)
The following theorem on optimal sampling of a Bernoulli processes is neces-
sary for proving our main result on information leakage of the FCFS sched-
uler. For the ease of notation, we define in the following
α
4
=
⌈
1

⌉− 1
⌈
1

⌉− ⌊1

⌋ , ∀ 0 <  < 1. (4.10)
Theorem 4.3.1. Consider sampling a Bernoulli arrival process δ = {δ1, δ2, · · · }
at times A = {A1, A2, · · · }. For a fixed sampling rate ω = lim
k→∞
k
Ak
, the fol-
1For the sake of convenience, we assume that when both the user and the attacker issue
a job in one time slot, the attacker’s job enters the queue first.
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Figure 4.4: Periodic sampling: given a sampling rate ω, the attacker issues
jobs (solid) periodically, with inter-arrival times chosen from
⌊
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ω
⌋
and
⌈
1
ω
⌉
.
For example, if ω = 0.4, the inter-arrival time A∗i − A∗i−1 would take values
of 2 and 3 with equal probability.
lowing periodic sampling strategy (Figure 4.4) is optimal:
A∗k − A∗k−1 =

⌊
1
ω
⌋
w.p. αω⌈
1
ω
⌉
w.p. 1− αω
, k ∈ Z. (4.11)
The optimality is defined in the sense of maximizing the entropy rate of the
sampled process. This optimal value is given by
lim
k→∞
H (N (A∗1) , · · · , N (A∗k))
k
= αωH
b 1ωc∑
i=1
δi
+ (1− αω)H
d 1ωe∑
i=1
δi
 .
(4.12)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Theorem 4.3.2. The information leakage of an FCFS scheduler serving a
user and an attacker is given by
LFCFS(λ) = (1− λ)
α1−λH
b 11−λc∑
i=1
δi
+ (1− α1−λ)H
d 11−λe∑
i=1
δi

 ,
(4.13)
where λ is the user’s arrival rate, and δi’s are i.i.d. Bernoulli(λ) random
variables. If 1
1−λ ∈ Z, (4.13) is simplified to LFCFS(λ) = (1−λ)H
(∑ 1
1−λ
i=1 δi
)
.
In particular, in the low-rate region, the user’s arrival pattern is completely
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leaked to the attacker:
lim
λ→0
RFCFS(λ) = 1. (4.14)
Proof. We first prove the converse part of (4.13) by showing that there ex-
ists no attack strategy that allows the attacker to learn more information
than (4.13).
From (4.1) and (4.8), we have
LFCFS(λ)
= max
A: lim
k→∞
k
Ak
<1−λ
lim
n→∞
I (δn; Am, q (A1) , q (A2) , · · · , q (Am))
n
(a)
≤ max
A: lim
k→∞
k
Ak
<1−λ
lim
n→∞
I (δn; Am,Xm)
n
= max
A: lim
k→∞
k
Ak
<1−λ
lim
n→∞
H (Xm) +H (Am|Xm)−H (Am|δn)−H (Xm|Am, δn)
n
(b)
= max
A: lim
k→∞
k
Ak
<1−λ
lim
n→∞
H (Xm) +H (Am|Xm)−H (Am|δn)
n
(c)
≤ max
A: lim
k→∞
k
Ak
<1−λ
lim
n→∞
H (Xm)
n
,
(4.15)
where Xk is the number of the user’s jobs that have arrived between time
Ak−1 and Ak andXk =
∑Ak−1
j=Ak−1 δj. Note that (a) results from the application
of data processing inequality [75, Theorem 2.8.1] to the Markov chain
δn → Am,Xm → Am, q (A1) , · · · , q (Am) , (4.16)
and (b) follows from the fact that Xm is a deterministic function of Am and
δn, and (c) results from the Markov chain2
δn → Xm → Am. (4.17)
2For FCFS, attack strategies can be divided into two types. The first type is fully
independent with the user’s behavior. The second type makes use of past departure
history; Ak depends on previous departure Dk−1. Since Dk−1 is uniquely determined once
Xk−1 is given, Am must be independent with δn given Xm. This implies the Markov
chain in (4.16).
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Recall the counting function in (4.9). The number of user’s jobs sent by
time Ak is N(Ak) =
∑k
j=1Xj. Hence, (4.15) can be rewritten as
LFCFS(λ) ≤ max
A: lim
k→∞
k
Ak
<1−λ
lim
n→∞
H (N (A1) , · · · , N (Am))
n
. (4.18)
This implies that the attacker learns at most a sampled version of the user’s
arrival process through this side channel.
From (4.2), (4.18) can be rewritten as
LFCFS(λ) ≤ max
A: lim
k→∞
k
Ak
<1−λ
lim
n→∞
H (N (A1) , · · · , N (Am))
m
· m
Am
· Am
n
= max
A: lim
k→∞
k
Ak
<1−λ
ω lim
n→∞
H (N (A1) , · · · , N (Am))
m
.
(4.19)
Applying Theorem 4.3.1,
LFCFS(λ) = max
ω<1−λ
ω
αωH
b 1ωc∑
i=1
δi
+ (1− αω)H
d 1ωe∑
i=1
δi


(d)
= (1− λ)
α1−λH
b 11−λc∑
i=1
δi
+ (1− α1−λ)H
d 11−λe∑
i=1
δi

 ,
(4.20)
where (d) simply applies the monotonic-increasing property of H
(∑k
i=1 δi
)
as a function of k. This completes the proof for the converse.
To prove the achievability of (4.13), we consider the periodic sampling
strategy defined in (4.11) (Figure 4.4), and derive a lower bound on the
information leakage, which turns out to meet the upper bound in (4.13). See
the proof details in Appendix A.2.
Once (4.13) is proven, we take the limit of leakage ratio as λ→ 0,
lim
λ→0
RFCFS(λ) (e)= H (δ1)
H(λ)
(f)
= 1, (4.21)
where (e) holds because lim
λ→0
α1−λ = 0 according to (4.10) and (f) follows
from the Bernoulli distribution of δi’s.
Theorem 4.3.2 proves that the attacker can recover the number of user’s
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Figure 4.5: Nonstop monitoring attack on a round robin scheduler.
jobs arriving in each sampling period, which becomes an accurate estimate
of the user’s job arrival pattern if the sampling frequency is high. When
the user sends jobs at a very low rate, the attacker can sample the queue
state almost every time slot, and thus would learn the user’s arrival pattern
completely (see Figure 4.2).
4.4 Round Robin
The next policy we study is round robin, where two users take turns to re-
ceive services. In each time slot, the service is switched to the next user
who has jobs waiting in the queue; the scheduler never serves any single user
continuously unless the other user runs out of jobs. To derive a lower bound
on the information leakage, we consider the nonstop monitoring attack intro-
duced in Section 4.2 (Figure 4.3), where the job arrival times and departure
times satisfy (4.5). For round robin, this attack forces the scheduler to serve
the attacker continuously if possible. As a result, the attacker learns when
the user’s queue becomes empty, as illustrated in Figure 4.5, or
q (Ak)
= 0 if Dk − Ak = 1> 0 if Dk − Ak = 2 , i ∈ Z. (4.22)
Notice in (4.22), the time gap between two consecutive departures of at-
tacker is at most two time slots. Hence, this attack is only applicable for the
region, where the user’s rate λ ≤ 0.5.
Define the busy period of the system as the time gap between two times
when the attacker finds the user’s queue is empty, and denote the rth busy
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period by Br. Br’s can be written as
Br = inf
{
Ak : Ak >
r−1∑
j=1
Bj and q (Ak) = 0
}
−
r−1∑
j=1
Bj. (4.23)
What the attacker learns from the side channel is summarized by the busy
period sequence B = {B1, B2, · · · }.
Theorem 4.4.1. The information leakage of a round robin scheduler serving
a user and an attacker is lower-bounded by
LRR(λ) ≥ (1− 2λ)H(B), for λ ≤ 0.5, (4.24)
where λ is the user’s arrival rate, B is the random variable distributed as
P (B = k)
=
2
r−1λr−1(1− λ)r max
{∑b r−22 c
j=1
(r−2)!
(r−2−2j)!j!(j+1)!2
−2j−1, 1
}
if k = 2r − 1,
0 otherwise,
(4.25)
where r ∈ Z+. In particular, when the user’s rate is very low, the attacker
learns completely the user’s traffic pattern, i.e.,
lim
λ→0
RRR(λ) = 1. (4.26)
Proof. Similar to (4.7), the nonstop monitoring attack results in a lower
bound on the leakage as given by
LRR(λ) ≥ lim
n→∞
I (δn; Dm)
n
(a)
= lim
n→∞
H (Dm)
n
,
(4.27)
where (a) holds because the attacker’s departure times fro the round robin
scheduler are deterministic once the user’s arrival pattern is known. From (4.5)
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and (4.22), we have
H (Dm) = H
(
1{q(A1)=0},1{q(A2)=0}, · · · ,1{q(Am)=0}
)
(b)
≥ H (B1, B2, · · · , Bm) ,
(4.28)
where (b) follows from the definition of busy periods in (4.23).
It can be further shown that the busy periods seen by the attacker, Br’s,
are i.i.d. distributed as (4.25) and have mean 1
1−2λ . The proof is presented
in Appendix A.4. Therefore, plugging (4.28) into (4.27) proves (4.24). Ad-
ditionally, taking the limit of (4.24) at λ → 0, the leakage ratio is lower-
bounded as
lim
λ→0
RRR(λ) ≥ lim
λ→0
(1− 2λ)H (B)
H(λ)
(c)
≥ lim
λ→0
−(1− λ) log(1− λ)− λ(1− λ)2 log(λ(1− λ)2)
−(1− λ) log(1− λ)− λ log λ ,
(4.29)
where (c) holds by plugging in the PMF of random variable B in (4.25) only
for the terms k = 1 and k = 3. The limit on the right-hand side of inequality
(c) goes to 1 as λ→ 0. This completes the proof.
Round robin is one of the simplest scheduling algorithms in multi-processor
operation systems and known for fairness [76]. However, our analysis shows
that in the low-rate region the round robin scheduler almost entirely leaks a
user’s traffic pattern through the timing side channel (see Figure 4.2).
4.5 Work-Conserving TDMA
The schedulers analyzed so far all leak substantial information about the
user’s traffic, especially when the user’s job arrival rate is low. This im-
poses serious threat to user privacy since many network systems have light
workloads. In fact, studies have shown that average server utilization in real-
world data centers is only about 5% to 20% [77]. In this section, we study
WC-TDMA, a tweak of TDMA, which can reduce the information leakage
in the low-rate traffic region by half.
In WC-TDMA, time slots are pre-assigned to the user and attacker equally.
Unlike TDMA, if in some slot the reserved user has no jobs left, the WC-
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TDMA scheduler serves the other user who has jobs waiting in the queue.
For the sake of convenience, we assume all odd time slots are assigned to the
user, and all even slots are assigned to the attacker.
We consider an attack strategy, where the attacker sends a job in each odd
slot and stays idle in all even slots, i.e.,
Ak = 2k − 1, k ∈ Z. (4.30)
Clearly, this attack consumes half of the service capacity, so is only applicable
when the user’s rate λ ≤ 0.5.
Since odd time slots are reserved for the user, the attacker’s jobs sent on
those slots would experience delays as follows:
Dk − Ak =
1 if q (Ak) = 0 and δAk = 02 otherwise , k ∈ Z. (4.31)
Therefore, the attacker learns the time slots when the queue is empty and
the user has not issued jobs.
Define the “busy period”, B′r, r ∈ Z, to be the time gap between two
successive times when the attacker sees an empty queue. Then,
B′r = inf
{
Ak : Ak >
r−1∑
j=1
B′j and q (Ak) = 0
}
−
r−1∑
j=1
B′j. (4.32)
Theorem 4.5.1. The information leakage of a WC-TDMA scheduler serving
a user and an attacker is lower-bounded by
LWC−TDMA(λ) ≥ 1− 2λ
2− 2λH (B) , for λ ≤ 0.5, (4.33)
where λ is the user’s arrival rate, and B is the random variable distributed
as (4.25).
Proof. Like (4.27) in the proof of Thereom 4.4.1, a lower bound on informa-
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tion leakage can be written as
LWC−TDMA(λ) ≥ lim
k→∞
H
(
Dk
)
2k
(a)
= lim
k→∞
H
(
1{q(1)=0},1{q(3)=0}, · · · ,1{q(2k−1)=0}
)
2k
(b)
≥ lim
k→∞
H (B′1, B
′
2, · · · , B′k′)
2k
,
(4.34)
where (a) follows from (4.30) and (4.31), and (b) follows from (4.32).
It can be shown that the busy periods seen by the attacker, B′r’s, are i.i.d.
distributed as (4.25) and have mean 2−2λ
1−2λ (see Appendix A.4). Hence, (4.34)
readily implies the desired lower bound.
Corollary 4.5.2. The information leakage ratio of a WC-TDMA scheduler
serving a user and an attacker is given by
lim
λ→0
RWC−TDMA(λ) = 1
2
, if λ→ 0. (4.35)
Proof. Taking the limit of (4.34) as λ→ 0, we get
lim
λ→0
RWC−TDMA(λ) ≥ lim
λ→0
1− 2λ
2− 2λ
H (B)
H(λ)
(a)
≥ 1
2
, (4.36)
where (a) follows from (4.29).
We subsequently derive an upper bound on the leakage ratio. Define Sk
to be the earliest time when the kth attacker’s job can receive service. Then
Sk = max{Dk−1, Ak}, and we have
I (δn; Am,Dm) = I (δn; Sm,Dm)
≤ H (Sm,Dm)
= H (D1 − S1, · · · , Dm − Sm)
(b)
≤
∑
k:Sk is odd
H (Dk − Sk) ,
(4.37)
where (b) follows from the fact that the attacker is served with priority in
even time slots, i.e., Dk−Sk ≡ 1, where Sk is even. On the other hand, since
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the user is served first during the odd time slots, similar to (4.31) we have
Dk − Sk =
1 if q(Sk) = 0 and δSk = 0,2 otherwise. (4.38)
Applying (4.38) to (4.37) and taking the limit at λ→ 0, we have
lim
λ→0
I (δn; Am,Dm) ≤
∑
k:A′k is odd
lim
λ→0
H (P (q(Sk) = 0) · (1− λ))
(c)
=
∑
k:Sk is odd
H (λ) ,
(4.39)
where (c) holds because
lim
λ→0
P (q(Sk) = 0) = 1, i ∈ Z. (4.40)
See Appendix A.6 for the proof of (4.40).
Plugging (4.40) into (4.39), we have
lim
λ→0
RWC−TDMA(λ) ≤ max
S: lim
k→∞
k
Sk
<1−λ
lim
n→∞
∑
k:Sk is odd
H (Dk − Sk)
nH(λ)
(d)
≤ 1
2
,
(4.41)
where (d) holds because at most half of the time slots are odd. Equation
(4.41) together with (4.36) prove (4.35).
4.6 Deterministic Work-Conserving Schedulers
In this section, we derive a universal lower bound on the information leakage
for the class of deterministic-work-conserving (det-WC) schedulers, where
the scheduler’s actions are deterministic (the same arrival instances result in
the same departure events), and the scheduler can idle only if there are no
jobs in the queue.
Theorem 4.6.1. The information leakage of a det-WC scheduler serving a
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user and an attacker is lower bounded by
Ldet−WC(λ) ≥ max
ω:ω<1−λ
ω(z0 − 1)
2z0
H(λ), (4.42)
where λ is the user’s arrival rate, and z0 is the only root of the equation
αωz(1− λ+ λz)d 1ωe + (1− αω)z2(1− λ+ λz)b 1ωc − zd 1ωe = 0, (4.43)
outside the unit circle.
Proof. We again consider the periodic-sampling attack, A∗ defined in (4.11),
under which the mutual information between the attacker’s observation and
the user’s arrival pattern is given by
I (δn; A∗m,D∗m)
(a)
= H (δn)−
n∑
i=1
H
(
δi
∣∣δi−1,A∗m,D∗m)
(b)
= H (δn)−
n∑
i=1
H
(
δi
∣∣q (1) , · · · , q (i) ,A∗m,D∗m)
≥ H (δn)−
n∑
i=1
H
(
δi
∣∣q (i) ,A∗m) ,
(4.44)
where (a) follows from the entropy chain rule, and (b) holds because given
δi−1 and A∗m, queue lengths at all time slots up to time i are known.
Define ai as the indicator of the attacker’s arrival event in time slot i.
Following (4.11), ai’s are i.i.d. distributed as
ai =
1 w.p. ω0 w.p. 1− ω , i ∈ Z. (4.45)
Applying (4.45) to (4.44), we have
I (δn; Am,Dm) ≥ H (δn)−
n∑
i=1
H
(
δi
∣∣q (i) , ai) . (4.46)
At some time slot i, assume the scheduler serves the user first when a tie of
queue length occurs. Additionally, assume the queue is empty, i.e., q (i) = 0,
and the attacker issues a new job, i.e., ai = 1. As argued before, in this case
the attacker knows whether the user issued a job or not in this slot without
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ambiguity. Since the scheduler does not know users’ identities, in the worst
case, the user has priority for at least half of time slots. Therefore, the afore-
mentioned scenario would at least occur with probability by 1
2
ωP (q(i) = 0).
Plugging this into (4.46), we have
I (δn; Am,Dm) ≥ H (δn)−
n∑
i=1
(
1− 1
2
ωP (q(i) = 0)
)
H (δi)
=
1
2
ωP (q(i) = 0)H (λ) .
(4.47)
We next derive the probability that the attacker sees an empty queue, i.e.,
P (q(i) = 0). From (4.11), we can write the update equation for queue lengths
sampled by the attacker as
q
(
A∗k+1
)
=
(
q
(
A∗k+1
)
+ Yk −
⌈
1
ω
⌉)
+
, k ∈ Z, (4.48)
where Yk’s are i.i.d. distributed as
Yk =
2 +X∗k w.p. αω1 +X∗′k w.p. 1− αω , (4.49)
where X∗k ∼ Binomial
(⌊
1
ω
⌋
, λ
)
, X∗′k ∼ Binomial
(⌈
1
ω
⌉
, λ
)
. The proba-
bility of the attacker seeing an empty queue can be derived by calculating
z-transform of q (Ak+1) in the steady state [78, (3)], which is given by
lim
k→∞
P
(
q
(
A∗k+1
)
= 0
)
=
z0 − 1
z0
, (4.50)
where z0 is the only root of αωz(1−λ+λz)d 1ωe+(1−αω)z2(1−λ+λz)b 1ωc−
zd 1ωe = 0 outside the unit circle.
Equations (4.47) and (4.50) readily imply the desired result in (4.42).
We plot the numerical solution of the bound in (4.42) in Figure 4.2. As
can be seen, the attacker always gains a significant amount of information
of the user in a det-WC scheduler, especially when the user’s rate λ is below
0.5. More specifically, as λ → 0, the user’s traffic pattern is leaked for at
least half of the time.
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CHAPTER 5
TIMING COVERT CHANNELS IN SHARED
QUEUES
The information leakage behavior of a shared scheduler can also be utilized
for covert communication, leading to the so-called timing covert channel.
One example is the cross-Virtual Network covert channel in data center net-
works. In data center networks, software-defined-networks (SDN) are fre-
quently used for load balancing [79], which generates logically isolated virtual
networks (VN), across which direct data exchange is impossible. However,
since packet flows belonging to different VNs inevitably share underlying
network infrastructure, like a router or a physical link, it is possible to trans-
fer data across VNs based on timing covert channels resulting from queue
sharing. In this chapter, we derive the capacity of such channels.
5.1 Preliminaries
We consider the same job scheduler as shown in Figure 5.1, which has two
users, Alice and Bob. At the beginning of each time slot, Alice (Bob) issues
a job to the scheduler or stays idle, and the scheduler can start processing a
job (if any), which leaves the job queue at the end of the slot. Alice and Bob
are not allowed to communicate directly. Based on the coupling of their jobs
in the queue, Alice creates a timing covert channel to send messages to Bob.
More specifically, Alice, as the sender, encodes a message on her job arrival
times, and Bob, as the receiver, decodes the message from queuing delays
experienced by his jobs. The information rate of this channel is determined by
the sender’s and receiver’s strategies of issuing jobs and more fundamentally
the scheduler’s service policy.
The covert channel can be depicted by the diagram in Figure 5.1. Fol-
lowing standard definitions in information theory [75, p. 192], we define the
codeword, rate, and channel capacity as follows.
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Figure 5.1: The timing covert channel between Alice and Bob sharing a job
scheduler.
Definition 3. An (M,n) code for the timing covert channel in a shared
scheduler consists of the following:
• An index set {1, 2, · · · ,M}.
• An encoding function f : {1, 2, · · · ,M} → {0, 1}n, which the sender,
Alice, uses to encode messages in her actions of issuing jobs during
each period of n time slots. Each codeword is a binary sequence, δn =
(δ1, · · · , δn), where δi = 1 if Alice issues a job at time i and δi = 0
otherwise.
• A decoding function g : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {1, 2, · · · ,M}, which is a
deterministic rule for the receiver, Bob, to guess Alice’s message based
on the events he observed in n time slots, which consists of two binary
sequences, σn = (σ1, · · · , σn) and σ′n = (σ′1, · · · , σ′n), where σi = 1
indicates that Bob issues a job at time i and σ′i = 1 indicates that one
of Bob’s jobs departs from the queue at time i.
Definition 4. Let
i = P
(
g
(
σn,σ′n
) 6= i|δn = f (i)) . (5.1)
The maximal probability of error max for an (M,n) code is defined as
max = max
i∈{1,2,··· ,M}
i. (5.2)
The average probability of error Pe for an (M,n) code is defined as
Pe =
1
M
M∑
i=1
i. (5.3)
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Table 5.1: Capacities of covert channels in common schedulers.
LQF FCFS round robin
Capacity(bits) 1 0.838 0.694
Definition 5. The rate R of an (M,n) code is
R =
logM
n
bits per transmission. (5.4)
Definition 6. A rate R is said to be achievable if there exists a sequence
of
(⌈
2nR
⌉
, n
)
codes such that the maximal probability of error tends to 0 as
n→∞. The capacity C of the timing covert channel is the supremum of all
achievable rates.
We also define the capacity of our channel with respect to the output rate
of the receiver’s jobs from the queue, which equals to his arrival rate if the
scheduler applies a work-conserving policy.
Definition 7. A rate R is said to be achievable at output rate ω if there
exists a sequence of
(⌈
2
mR
ω
⌉
, m
ω
)
codes such that the maximal probability of
error tends to 0 as m → ∞. The capacity of the channel at output rate ω
C(ω) is the supremum of all achievable rates at output rate ω.
Theorem 5.1.1. The capacity C of the timing covert channel in a shared
scheduler satisfies
C = sup
ω<1
C (ω) . (5.5)
Proof. See [48, Appendix II].
It is already known that the covert channel in a shared round robin sched-
uler has the capacity as 0.694 bits per transmission [40]. Moreover, the covert
channel capacity of an LQF scheduler is an immediate result from our anal-
ysis of information leakage in Section 4.2. For LQF, the receiver can learn
the exact arrival times of the sender’s jobs by keeping one job in the queue
all the time. Therefore, the channel capacity must be 1 bit per transmission,
which equals to the maximal entropy rate of the sender’s job arrival process.
In the rest of this chapter, we focus on the FCFS scheduler, and derive the
capacity of its covert channel, which is listed in Table 5.1.
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5.2 First-Come-First-Serve
It is well known that the capacity of a discrete time memoryless channel
(DMC) can be written as
C = lim
n→∞
sup
Xn
1
n
I (Xn; Yn) , (5.6)
where Xn and Yn are the input and output codewords, respectively. Unfor-
tunately, our covert channel in an FCFS queue is not memoryless. At any
time slot, the future departure events depend on the current queue state,
which is clearly a function of all past arrival events.
For a channel with memory, Verdu´ et al. have derived a general formula
for channel capacity as
C = sup
X
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log
P (Yn|Xn)
P (Xn)
, (5.7)
where log P(Y
n|Xn)
P(Xn) is called the information density [80]. As the sender and
receiver can take arbitrary strategies in issuing jobs, it is hard to directly
compute the lim inf in (5.7). Hence, we consider a “simplified” channel by
restricting the actions of the sender and the receiver, for which the capacity
can be computed from (5.7). This readily provides a lower bound on the
capacity of our original channel (Section 5.2.2), which turns out to meet an
upper bound we derive in the Section 5.2.1.
5.2.1 Converse Theorem
Theorem 5.2.1. The timing covert channel in a shared FCFS scheduler
satisfies
C(ω) ≤ sup
λ<1−ω
αωωh
(⌊
1
ω
⌋
, λ
)
+ (1− αω)ωh
(⌈
1
ω
⌉
, λ
)
, (5.8)
where αω =
d 1ωe− 1ω
d 1ωe−b 1ωc and the function h : Z× R→ R is defined as
h (k, µ) = sup
X∈{0,1,··· ,k}
E[X]=kµ, 0<µ<1
H (X) .
(5.9)
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Proof. Let W denote the message sent by Alice and Wˆ denote the message
decoded by Bob. For every (M,n) code, we have
logM
(a)
≤ 1
1− Pe
[
I
(
W ; Wˆ
)
+ log 2
]
(b)
≤ 1
1− Pe
[
I
(
δn;σn,σ′n
)
+ log 2
]
,
(5.10)
where (a) follows from Fano’s inequality [75, Theorem 2.11.1] and (b) results
from the application of data processing inequality [75, Theorem 2.8.1] to the
following Markov chain:
W → δn → σn,σ′n → Wˆ, (5.11)
which is straightforward from the diagram in Figure 5.1.
Assume Bob’s job rate is ω and m of his jobs departed the queue by time
n, i.e., m = sup{k : σ′k = 1, k ≤ n}. Denote the arrival and departure times
of these jobs by Am = (A1, · · · , Am) and Dm = (D1, · · · , Dm), respectively.
Define Xi =
∑Ai
j=Ai−1+1 δj as the total number of Alice’s jobs sent between
time Ai and Ai+1. We can rewrite (5.10) as
logM≤ 1
1− Pe [I (δ
n; Am,Dm) + log 2]
(c)
≤ 1
1− Pe
[
m∑
i=1
H (Xi) + log 2
]
,
(5.12)
where (c) follows from (4.15).
Multiplying both sides of (5.12) by ω
m
and denoting the mean of Xi by λi,
we get
ω
logM
m
≤ ω
1− Pe
(
1
m
m∑
i=1
H (Xi) +
log 2
m
)
≤ ω
1− Pe
(
1
m
m∑
i=1
h (Ai+1 − Ai, λi) + log 2
m
)
,
(5.13)
where h (Ai+1 − Ai, λi) is the maximal entropy of Xi, defined as in (5.9).
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The function h (k, µ) turns out to be concave on both k and µ.1 See
Appendix B.2 for details. Therefore, applying Jensen’s inequality, (5.13) can
be rewritten as
ω
logM
m
≤ ω
1− Pe
(
αωh
(⌊
1
ω
⌋
, λ
)
+ (1− αω)h
(⌈
1
ω
⌉
, λ
)
+
log 2
m
)
,
(5.14)
where αω =
d 1ωe− 1ω
d 1ωe−b 1ωc and λ =
∑m
i=1 λi
m
is the overall arrival rate of Alice’s
jobs.
For a sequence of codes
(⌈
2
ωR
m
⌉
, ω
m
)
, we know from Definition 7 that
Pe → 0 as m → 0 if R is achievable. Replacing M by
⌈
2
ωR
m
⌉
in (5.15) and
taking the limit at m→ 0, we can upper-bound any achievable rate R as
R ≤ αωωh
(⌊
1
ω
⌋
, λ
)
+ (1− αω)ωh
(⌈
1
ω
⌉
, λ
)
, (5.15)
which implies (5.8).
Theorem 5.2.2. The timing covert channel in a shared FCFS scheduler
satisfies
C ≤ 0.8377 bits per transmission. (5.16)
Proof. From (5.5) and (5.8), we have
C ≤ sup
λ+ω<1
αωωh
(⌊
1
ω
⌋
, λ
)
+ (1− αω)ωh
(⌈
1
ω
⌉
, λ
)
. (5.17)
For each pair of (λ, ω), we can calculate the optimal distribution maximiz-
ing h (k, µ). See Appendix B.1. The numerical solution of the supremum
in (5.17) equals to 0.8377 (achieved by ω = 0.61).
5.2.2 Achievability Theorem
For the achievability, we consider the sender and receiver take actions as
follows:
1For a discrete function, we consider integrally-concavity, which is similar as the inte-
grally convexity defined in [81]. Strictly speaking, h (k, µ) is an integrally concave function
on k.
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• Bob sends jobs periodically with rate ω, i.e.,
Ai − Ai−1 =

⌊
1
ω
⌋
w.p. αω⌈
1
ω
⌉
w.p. 1− αω
, i ∈ Z, (5.18)
where αω =
d 1ωe− 1ω
d 1ωe−b 1ωc .
• The number of Alice’s jobs sent betweenAi andAi+1, Xi ∈ {0, 1, · · · , Ai+1−
Ai}, satisfies
E[Xi] = (Ai − Ai−1)λ, i ∈ Z, (5.19)
where λ < 1− ω.
Denote the channel capacity when Alice and Bob send jobs according
to (5.18) and (5.19) by
¯
C(ω).
Theorem 5.2.3. The timing covert channel in a shared FCFS scheduler
satisfies
¯
C(ω) ≥ αωωh
(⌊
1
ω
⌋
, 1− ω
)
+ (1− αω)ωh
(⌈
1
ω
⌉
, 1− ω
)
, (5.20)
where αω =
d 1ωe− 1ω
d 1ωe−b 1ωc and the function h (·, ·) is defined in (5.9).
Proof. From (5.7), we have
¯
C(ω) = sup
δ
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log
P (σn,σ′n|δn)
P (σn,σ′n)
(a)
= sup
δ
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log
P (Am,Dm|δn)
P (Am,Dm)
,
(5.21)
where (a) follows from that there is a one-to-one mapping from (Am,Dm) to
(σn,σ′n).
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We can decompose P (Am,Dm|δn) in (5.21) as
P (Am,Dm|δn) =
m∏
i=1
P
(
Ai|Ai−11 , δn
)
P
(
Di|Di−11 ,Am, δn
)
(b)
=
m∏
i=1
P (Ai|Ai−1)P
Di∣∣∣Ai, Di−1, Ai∑
j=Ai−1+1
δj

=
m∏
i=1
P (Ai|Ai−1)P (Di|Ai, Di−1, Xi−1) ,
(5.22)
where (b) follows from (5.18) and the update equation of queue state as given
by
Di − Ai − 1 = (Di−1 − Ai−1 +Xi − (Ai − Ai−1))+ . (5.23)
Similarly, we have
P (Am,Dm) =
m∏
i=1
P (Ai|Ai−1)P (Di|Ai, Di−1) . (5.24)
Substituting (5.22) and (5.24) into (5.21), we get
¯
C(ω) = sup
δ
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
m∑
i=1
log
P (Di|Ai, Di−1, Xi−1)
P (Di|Ai, Di−1)
= sup
δ
lim inf
m→∞
ω
m
m∑
i=1
log
P (Xi−1|Ai, Di−1, Di)
P (Xi−1)
.
(5.25)
Recall in (5.19), Xi’s are i.i.d distributed. Thus,
lim
m→∞
1
m
m∑
i=1
P (Xi−1)
p.→ E [P (X1)] = −H (X1) . (5.26)
Furthermore, it can be easily verified that (Xi−1, Ai, Di−1, Di) has a sta-
tionary distribution as i → ∞ (using a similar queuing analysis as in Ap-
pendix A.3). Denoting the stationary state by (X ,A,D1,D2), we have
lim
m→∞
1
m
m∑
i=1
P (Xi−1|Ai, Di−1, Di) p.→ E [P (X|A,D1,D2)]
= −I (X ;A,D1,D2) .
(5.27)
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Substituting (5.26) and (5.27) into (5.25), we get
¯
C(ω) = ω sup
δn
H (X1)− I (X ;A,D1,D2) . (5.28)
Recall Theorem 4.3.2 in Section 4.3. When the total job arrival rate λ +
ω → 1, Bob always knows the number of Alice’s jobs sent between his own
two consecutive jobs, i.e., as λ→ 1− ω, I (X ;A,D1,D2)→ 0. Hence, (5.28)
can be rewritten as
¯
C(ω) = ω sup
δn
H (X1) . (5.29)
As X1 satisfies (5.19), (5.29) readily implies (5.20).
Theorem 5.2.4. The timing covert channel in a shared FCFS scheduler
satisfies
C ≥ 0.8377 bits per transmission. (5.30)
Proof. First,
¯
C(ω) lower-bounds C. Thus from (5.20), we have
C ≥ sup
ω<1
αωωh
(⌊
1
ω
⌋
, 1− ω
)
+ (1− αω)ωh
(⌈
1
ω
⌉
, 1− ω
)
. (5.31)
Solving the supremum in (5.31) numerically results in (5.30).
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CHAPTER 6
FLOW WATERMARKS FOR CHANNELS
WITH DEPENDENT SUBSTITUTION,
DELETION, AND BURSTY INSERTION
ERRORS
In this chapter, we study a different topic: flow watermarking, and present a
scheme that is applicable to network environments with packet drops, splits,
and jitter.
6.1 Preliminaries
We first describe three application scenarios of flow watermarking, and then
discuss principles for designing good watermarking schemes.
We begin with a stepping stone detection scenario where flow watermarks
are used to find hidden network attackers. Figure 6.1 depicts an attacker
Bob who wants to attack a victim Alice without exposing his own identity.
Bob first remotely logins to a compromised intermediate host Charlie via
SSH [24]. Then he proceeds by sending attack flows to Alice from Charlie’s
machine. Tracing packet flows sent to Alice’s machine would implicate Char-
lie instead of Bob as the attacker. Hosts like Charlie, exploited to hide the
real attack source, are called as stepping stones [35]. In real life, attackers
may hide behind a chain of stepping stones, making it hard for the victim,
who only sees the last hop, to determine the origin of the attack. Fortunately,
flow watermarking is a solution for tracing the attack source. Notice that
an interactive connection is maintained along Bob-Charlie-Alice during the
above stepping stone attack. Hence Alice can secretly embed a watermark
in the packet flow heading back to Charlie. As this flow travels back to Bob,
the watermark could be subsequently detected by the intermediate routers
(or firewalls), revealing the attack path and its true origin [82,83].
Another scenario of stepping stone attack occurs in enterprise networks,
as shown in Figure 6.2(a). Here, intruders are trying to compromise hosts
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Figure 6.1: Detecting attackers behind stepping stones.
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Figure 6.2: Flow linking in enterprise and anonymity networks.
in an enterprise network to relay their malicious traffic [37, 84]. To dis-
cover this kind of stepping stones within the network, an enterprise can add
watermarks on all incoming flows, and then terminate outgoing flows that
contain the watermark since they most probably come from stepping stones.
In a similar fashion, flow watermarking may be applied to attacking anony-
mous (anonymity) network systems [85–87]. In order to hide the identities of
communicating parties, an anonymity network shuﬄes all the flows passing
through it, as shown in Figure 6.2(b). If an attacker somehow discovers the
hidden mappings between incoming and outgoing flows, the anonymity is
compromised. Akin to the previous enterprise network scenario, this can be
achieved by marking all incoming flows with watermarks and subsequently
detecting the watermarks on the exiting flows.
6.1.1 Design Principles
We review a list of principles for designing flow watermarks. The challenge
of building an efficient scheme lies in the difficulty of achieving all desired
properties simultaneously.
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Robustness: One major advantage of flow watermarking over passive traf-
fic analysis is the robustness against network noise. Take the stepping stone
attack of Figure 6.1 for example. The flow Alice sends back to Bob is sub-
jected to jitter, packet drops, and packet splits during transmission. All these
artifacts can alter the watermark, resulting in decoding errors. Without the
ability to withstand these artifacts, flow watermarking is no different than
passive analysis, which is fragile by nature.
Invisibility: A successful watermark pattern should stay invisible to avoid
possible attacks. For instance, in Figure 6.2(a), if the intruder notices that
incoming flows contain watermarks, it can command the stepping stone to
take precautionary actions (for instance, remove the watermarks altogether).
Blindness: In a blind watermarking scheme, the watermark pattern can
be extracted without the help of the original flow [88]. On the contrary,
the original flow must be present in order to detect non-blind watermarks.
Again, consider the example of Figure 6.2(a). In order to detect the stepping
stone, the enterprise needs to perform watermark decoding on all outgoing
flows. If a non-blind detection scheme is used, all exit routers are required to
obtain a copy of each incoming flow. The resulting overheads of bandwidth
and storage make such schemes impractical in large enterprise networks.
Zero-bit: In conventional digital watermarking (e.g., multimedia water-
marking), often a large amount of hiding capacity is desired as the injected
watermarks are frequently used to achieve copyright protection among many
users [89]. This, fortunately, is not required for most flow watermarking
applications, since the main purpose of injecting watermarks here is to link
flows initiated from the same sources. In other words, in digital watermark-
ing terminology, zero-bit or presence watermarks suffice [88]. Therefore, when
designing a flow watermarking scheme, one may trade the capacity for other
properties such as robustness.
6.1.2 Notations and Definitions
In the rest of the chapter, we use the following notation: ab = {a1, a2, · · · , ab}
is a sequence of length b; art = {at, · · · , ar} is a sequence in ab starting with
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index r and ending with t. Specially, if r ≤ t, art is an empty sequence,
denoted by ∅; ⊕ denotes the xor operation.
We also define the following variables used in our scheme.
• IM is the IPD sequence of an original packet flow, where each delay, Ii,
is positive real valued.
• I′M is the IPD sequence of the same flow after injection of the water-
mark pattern.
• IˆM ′ is the IPD sequence received by the watermark decoder.
• wn is the binary watermark sequence.
• w˜N is a sparse version of wN , where N = sn.
• s is the sparsification factor and is integer valued.
• f is the density of w˜N (see (6.2)).
• kN is a pseudo-random binary key sequence.
• xN is a binary sequence (codeword), generated from the watermark wn
and the key kN , and embedded into flow IPDs.
• yN ′ is an estimate of xN the decoder sees.
• wˆn is the estimate of the watermark sequence wn after decoding.
• ∆ is a real-value step size used for IPD quantizations. It represents the
strength of the watermark signal.
• σ is the standard deviation of jitter.
• Ps, PI , and Pd represent the probability of a substitution, an insertion,
and a deletion event in the timing stenographic channel (modeled from
watermarking embedding/extraction procedures), respectively.
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Figure 6.3: An overview of the proposed flow watermarking scheme.
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Figure 6.4: Abstraction of timing stenographic channel with insertion,
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6.2 An Invisible and Robust Scheme
Figure 6.3 depicts the schematic of our scheme, which can be divided into two
layers: the insertion deletion substitution (IDS) encoder (decoder), and the
quantization index modulation (QIM) encoder (decoder). In the upper layer,
the watermark sequence wn is processed to generate an IDS error-correction
codeword xN . On the lower layer, a QIM framework is used to inject xN
into the IPDs of the flow. QIM embedding is blind and causes little change
to packet timings [21]. Upon receiving the flow, the QIM decoder extracts
the pattern yN
′
. Subsequently an IDS decoder recovers the watermark, wˆn,
from this pattern.
If we abstract the QIM encoder, the network, and the QIM decoder to-
gether as a timing stenographic channel, which takes xN as the input and
spits out yN
′
, flow watermarking is equivalent to solving the problem of
sending one bit of information (the presence of the watermark) over this
compound communication channel (see Figure 6.4). Codes for this com-
pound channel must withstand dependent substitution, deletion, and bursty
insertion errors. We next introduce each component of our scheme in details.
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6.2.1 Insertion Deletion Substitution Encoder
Our IDS error correction scheme is inspired by [90,91], where a “marker” code
is employed to provide reliable communications over a channel with deletion
and insertion errors. However, the approach in [90, 91] is not directly appli-
cable to our channel, as we need to deal with somewhat more complicated
errors, such as dependent substitution, deletion, and bursty insertions.
The IDS encoder works as follows. The watermark sequence wn is first
sparsified into a longer sequence w˜N of length N = sn, as given by
w˜js(j−1)s+1 = S (wj) , j = 1, 2, · · · , n, (6.1)
where S(·) is a deterministic sparsification function that pads wj with trailing
zeros, and is known at the decoder. We denote by density f the ratio of 1’s
in w˜N , i.e.,
f =
∑N
i=1 w˜i
N
. (6.2)
f is a decoding parameter shared with the IDS decoder. The sparsified
watermark w˜N is then added to a key kN to form the codeword xN :
xi = w˜i ⊕ ki, i = 1, 2, · · · , N, (6.3)
where kN is a pseudo-random key sequence also known at the decoder.
Let us work on a small example of embedding one bit of watermark w1 = 1
in a length 8 sequence. First w1 is sparsified into an 8 bit sequence w˜
8 =
10000000 (the sparsification factor s = 8). Then we add this sparse sequence
to the first 8 bit of our key, k8 = 11111011. The resulting codeword is
x8 = 01111011. Because x8 is only different from the key at one position,
the decoder could infer the positions of deleted or inserted bits by comparing
the received codeword with the key. For instance, if the decoder receives
a codeword y7 = 0111011, one bit shorter than the key, then it knows that
most likely a bit “1” from the second run was lost during transmission. Based
on this observation, a probabilistic decoder can be developed to fully recover
embedded bits, as will be discussed in Section 6.2.3.
Since wˆN is sparse, the codeword xN is close to the key, which is known
at the IDS decoder. Therefore, the IDS encoding helps synchronize the
lost/inserted bits at the cost of information capacity over the channel, which
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Fig. 5. An example of substitution errors caused by network jitter. ‘x’s denote even quantizers and ‘o’s odd quantizers. The
bit embedded in I1 is ‘1’, but the decoded bit from Iˆ1 (delay between received packets 0 and 1) is ‘0’.
who already knows the key kN . Therefore, the IDS encoding helps retrieve synchronization of lost/inserted
bits at the price of information capacity over the channel, which luckily is not a concern of flow
watermarking (see §II-B).
C. Insertion Deletion Substitution (IDS) Channel
1) QIM Embedding: We inject the codeword xN into IPDs of a packet flow using QIM. Given a
quantization step size  , the QIM encoder changes the IPD Ii into an even (or odd) multiplier of  2 if
the embedded bit xi is a bit 0 (or 1). The IPDs after modifications then become
I 0i =
8>><>>:
⇠
max(
Pi
j=1 Ii 
Pi 1
j=1 I
0
j ,0)
 
⇡
  if xi = 0✓⇠
max(
Pi
j=1 Ii 
Pi 1
j=1 I
0
j ,0)
 
⇡
+ 0.5
◆
  if xi = 1
(4)
for i = 1, 2, · · ·N , where the floor function describes the operation that adds minimum delays on Packet i
to form the desired multiplier of  2 .
At the QIM decoder, each embedded bit is extracted based on whether a received IPD is closer to an
even or odd quantizer, as given by
yi =
8<: b
2Iˆi
  c mod 2 if 2Iˆi    b2Iˆi  c  0.5
d2Iˆi  e mod 2 if 2Iˆi    b2Iˆi  c > 0.5
(5)
2) Channel Errors: In presence of network artifacts, received IPDs IˆM
0
are different from IM , leading
to errors in decoding xN . Substitution errors occur when network jitter alters IPDs largely. Figure 5 depicts
one example where an embedded bit is flipped by jitter. In Figure 5, the bit ‘x1 = 1’ was originally
encoded in the IPD I1, making I 01 =
 
2 . But at the QIM decoder, the received IPD Iˆ1 is pushed by jitter
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Figure 6.5: An example of substitution errors caused by network jitter. x’s
denote eve quantizers an o’s odd quantizers.
is not a concern for flow watermarking in the first place.
6.2.2 Insertion, Deletion, and Substitution Errors
The codeword xN is injected into IPDs of the original flow using QIM em-
bedding. Given a quantization step size ∆, the QIM encoder changes the
IPD, Ii, into an even (or odd) multiplier of ∆/2 given the embedded bit xi
is a bit 0 (or 1). The IPDs after modifications are given by
I ′i =

⌈
max{∑ij=1 Ij−∑i−1j=1 I′j ,0}
∆
⌉
∆ if xi = 0,(⌈
max{∑ij=1 Ij−∑i−1j=1 I′j ,0}
∆
⌉
+ 0.5
)
∆ if xi = 1,
i = 1, 2, · · ·N,
(6.4)
where the ceiling function describes the operation that adds minimum delays
to Packet i to form the desired multiplier of ∆
2
.
At the QIM decoder, each embedded bit is extracted based on whether a
received IPD is closer to an even or odd quantizer, i.e.,
yi =
{
b2Iˆi
∆
c mod 2 if 2Iˆi
∆
− b2Iˆi
∆
c ≤ 0.5,
d2Iˆi
∆
e mod 2 if 2Iˆi
∆
− b2Iˆi
∆
c > 0.5. i = 1, 2, · · ·N. (6.5)
In the presence of network artifacts, received IPDs, IˆM
′
, are different from
the original IPDs, IM , leading to errors in decoding xN . Substitution errors
occur when network jitter alters IPDs largely. Figure 6.5 depicts one example
where an embedded bit is flipped by jitter. In Figure 6.5, the bit “x1 = 1”
was originally encoded in the IPD I1, resulting in I
′
1 =
∆
2
. But at the QIM
decoder, the received IPD Iˆ1 is pushed by jitter into interval (
3∆
4
,∆), and
thus decoded as “y1 = 0”. In absence of packet drops or splits, a watermark
bit flips if the IPD jitter is larger than ∆
4
. Following the observation of
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Fig. 6. Merging of IPDs as the result of packet drops. The deletion of Packet 1 merges the first two IPDs I1 and I2. and the
deletions of Packet 3 and 4 merge I3, I4 and I5.
into interval (3 4 , ), and thus decoded as ‘y1 = 0’. In absence of packet drop or split, a watermark
bit can get flipped if the IPD jitter has strength larger than  4 . Following the observation of previous
work that shows IPD jitter (within a certain period of time) is approximately i.i.d. zero-mean Laplace
distributed [9], the probability of a substitution error by jitter can be estimated as
Ps = 1  F
✓
 
4
◆
or
1
2
e
  
2
p
2  . (6)
where F (·) is the pdf of a Laplacian variable and  2 is its variance.
Decoding errors also occur when packet are dropped. As packet drop leads to the merger of successive
IPDs, the resulting error contains both deletion and substitution, which we refer to dependent deletion
and substitution error. For instance in Figure 6, deletion of Packet 1 merges the IPDs I1 and I2 into a
large IPD I 01. As a result, instead of x1 and x2, only one bit x1  x2 is sent to the decoder. We consider
this case as a deletion of x1, and possibly a subsititution of x2. In this paper, we assume that each packet
is dropped independently with probability of Pd. For the convenience of analysis, we also assume that
the head (Packet 0) of watermarked packet sequence is not dropped.2
The last type of error comes from packet insertions. This happens when packets are split to meet a
smaller packet size limit, or when TCP transmission is triggered by network congestions would result.
Both cases cause bursty insertions of packets, and thus decoding errors of xN . An example is depicted
by Figure 7. As Packet 2 is split into three smaller ones, creating two new IPDs (2-2’ and 2’-2”, both
2In practice, we can repeatedly embed a watermark sequence in difference locations of a flow. Hence, with larger probability
at lease one watermarked portion meets this assumption.
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Figure 6.6: Merging of IPDs as the result of packet drops.
previous work that shows IPD jitter (within a certain period of time) is
approximately i.i.d. zero-mean Laplace distributed [19], the probability of a
substitution error by jitter can be estimated as
Ps = 1− F
(
∆
4
)
=
1
2
e
−∆
2
√
2σ , (6.6)
where F (·) is the Laplacian pdf and σ2 is its variance.
Decoding errors also occur when packets are dropped. As packet drops lead
to the merger of successive IPDs, the resulting error contains both deletion
and sub titution, which we efer to as depende t deletion and substitution
error. For instan e in Figure 6.6, deletion of Pack t 1 m rg s the IPDs
I1 and I2 to a large received IPD I
′
1. As a result, instead of x1 a d x2,
only one bit x1 ⊕ x2 is received at the decoder. We consider this case as
a deletion of x1, and possibly a substitution of x2. In this dissertation, we
assume that each packet is dropped independently with probability Pd. For
the convenience of analysis, we also assume that the head of watermarked
packet sequence, Packet 0, is not dropped.
The last type of error comes from packet insertions. This happens when
packets are split to meet a smaller packet size limit, or when TCP transmis-
sion is triggered by network congestions. Both cases cause bursty insertions
of packets. An example of such a scenario is depicted in Figure 6.7. Packet 2
is split into three smaller ones, creating two new IPDs (2-2’ and 2’-2”, both
with z ro le gth). Th refor , two extra 0 bits would be decoded in yN
′
. In
general, newly generated packets are mostly right next to the original one,
hence we consider all inserted bits are 0’s.1 We assume the number of inserted
packets follows a geometric distribution with parameter PI .
1Our methodology can be extended to cover the case that bits with values of both 0
and 1 may be inserted.
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Fig. 7. A scenario with packet insertions. Packet 1 is split into two packets, and Packet 2 is split into three pieces.
with zero length), two extra ‘0’ bits would be decoded into yN
0
. In general, newly generated packets are
mostly right next to the original one, hence we considered all inserted bits are‘0’s.3. Besides, we assume
the number of inserted packets is assumed to follow a geometric distribution with parameter Pi.
D. Insertion Deletion Substitution (IDS) Decoder
We estimate each watermark bit from yN
0
using maximum likelihood decoding as given by
wˆj = arg max
wj2{0,1}
P
⇣
yN
0 |wj
⌘
, j = 1, 2, · · · , n. (7)
Since xN is a deterministic function of w, we derive the likelihood in (7) based on the dependency
between yN
0
and xN over the IDS channel. Suppose the QIM decoder received q0 packets from the first q
packets sent from the QIM encoder. Now consider the events after Packet q+1 is sent. If Packet q+1
is lost and no packets are inserted, then the QIM decoder cannot decode new bits. On the other hand, if
Packet q + 1 is received successfully (or dropped but with packets inserted right after), new IPDs are
formed in the received flow. The first newly formed IPD is a merger of all IPDs between Packet q + 1
and the last received packet, say Packet t (o  q). Assume l packets are inserted following Packet q+1,
these IPDs shall generate decoded bits yq
0+1+l
q0+1 (or y
q0+l
q0+1). yq0+1 is decoded according to two cases as
3Our methodology can be extended to cover the case that both ‘0’ and ‘1’ bits may be inserted.
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Figure 6.7: A scenario with packet insertions.
6.2.3 Insertion Deletion Subs itution Decoder
We estimate each watermark bit from yN
′
using the maximum likelihood
dec di g rule given by
wˆj = arg max
wj∈{0,1}
P
(
yN
′ |wj
)
, j = 1, 2, · · · , n. (6.7)
Since xN is a deterministic function of w, we derive the likelihood in (6.7)
based on the dependency between yN
′
and xN over the IDS channel. Suppose
the QIM decoder received i′−1 packets after the first i−1 packets were sent
out by the QIM encoder, and assume the i′ − 1th packet in the received flow
corresponds to the qth packet in the sent flow or a packet inserted immediately
after it (q ≤ i− 1). The possible outcomes after Packet i is sent are:
1. I Packet i in the sent fl w is lost and no packets are in r ed, the QIM
decoder can ot ecode new bits.
2. If Packet i is lost but l > 0 new packets are inserted right after it, the
decoder could decode l bits, yi
′+l−1
i′ , from newly received IPDs.
3. If Packet i is received and additionally l ≥ 0 packets are inserted, the
decoder can decode l + 1 new bits, yi
′+l
i′ .
In the last two cases, the IPD between the i′ − 1th packet and i′th packets
in the received flow corresponds to the merger of all IPDs between Packet q
and Packet i in the sent flow. Hence, the first new bit, yi′ , is given by
yi′ =
xq+1 ⊕ xq+2 · · · ⊕ xi w.p. 1− Ps,xq+1 ⊕ xq+2 · · · ⊕ xi ⊕ 1 w.p. Ps, (6.8)
where Ps is the probability of a substitution error given in (6.6). The re-
maining new bits yi
′+l−1
i′+1 (or y
i′+l
i′+1) are just 0 bits resulting from bursty packet
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insertions.
6.2.4 Hidden Markov Model
To capture the evolution of newly decoded bits from the received flow, we
define the state after sending each packet with the pair (x′i, di), for i =
1, 2, · · ·N :
• The accumulated bit x′i it the sum of all bits resulting from merger of
the IPDs between Packet i and the previous packet lastly received at
the decoder. If Packet i− 1 was received (not dropped), then the x′i is
just the bit embedded on the IPD between Packet i and i− 1, i.e., xi.
On the other hand, if Packet i− 1 was “completely” lost (i.e., after its
deletion, there were no insertions), x′i would be the sum of current bit
xi and bits embedded on previously merged IPDs, i.e., xi ⊕ x′i−1. To
sum up,
x′i =
xi w.p. 1− Pd (1− PI) ,xi ⊕ x′i−1 w.p. Pd (1− PI) . (6.9)
Applying (6.9), we can rewrite (6.8) as
yi′ =
x′i w.p. 1− Ps,x′i ⊕ 1 w.p. Ps. (6.10)
Recall from (6.3) that xN is generatd using the key kN and the sparse
watermark sequence w˜. We will model the sparse watermark bits w˜i’s
as independent Bernoulli(f) random variables. Therefore (6.9) can be
rewritten as
x′i =

ki w.p. (1− f) (1− Pd(1− PI)) ,
ki ⊕ 1 w.p. f (1− Pd(1− PI)) ,
ki ⊕ x′i−1 w.p. (1− f)Pd (1− PI) ,
ki ⊕ x′i−1 ⊕ 1 w.p. fPd (1− PI) .
(6.11)
• The drift di is the shift in position of the sent Packet i in the received
flow, i.e., if Packet i was not lost, it would appear at position i′ = i+di
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Fig. 8. The hidden-Markov model for the IDS channel. The observations are the codewords (yi’s) received by the IDS decoder,
and the hidden states keep track of the drift and accumulated bit when sending every packet.
Given the definition of drift, q0 back in (8) shall be q + dq+1. Moreover, making use of (10), we can
rewrite (8) as
yq+1+dq+1 =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
x0q   kq+1 w. p. ((1  f)(1  Ps) + fPs)Pd(1  Pi);
x0q   kq+1   1 w. p. (f(1  Ps) + (1  f)Ps)Pd(1  Pi);
kq+1 w. p. ((1  f)(1  Ps) + fPs) (1  Pd(1  Pi));
kq+1   1 w. p. (f(1  Ps) + (1  f)Ps) (1  Pd(1  Pi)).
(12)
(12) implies a HMM built on hidden states of (x0r, dr), r = 1, 2, · · ·N and observation states of
yN
0
, as depicted in Figure 8. The state transition probabilities, i.e., P (yi 1+dii 1+di 1 , x
0
i, di|x0i 1, di 1), i =
1, 2, · · · , N , can be derived from (10), (11) and (12).
For example, at state of (x0r, dr), assume Packet r is dropped and no packets are inserted after. In this
case, based on (11), dr+1 = dr  1, and yr+dr+1r+dr is an empty sequence. Additionally, the accumulated bit
x0r+1 shall be updated following the first two cases of (10). Combining the probabilities in (11) and (10),
the final transition probability is given by
P
 ;, x0r+1, dr   1|x0r, dr  =
8>><>>:
fPd(1  Pi) if x0r+1 = x0r   kr+1   1;
(1  f)Pd(1  Pi) if x0r+1 = x0r   kr+1.
(13)
A complete list of P (yr 1+drr 1+dr 1 , x
0
r, dr|x0r 1, dr 1) for all possible transitions is given in Table II.
On the HMM in Figure 8, we apply a forward-backward algorithm to derive the posterior probabilities
for watermark decoding, P (yN
0 |wj), j = 1, 2, · · · , n. First, we define the forward quantity as the joint
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Figure 6.8: The hidden-Markov model for the IDS channel.
in the received flow. Given di−1, the drift of Packet i is updated as
di =
di−1 − 1 w.p. Pd (1− PI) ,di−1 + l, l ≥ 0 w.p. PdP l+1I (1− PI) + (1− Pd)P lI(1− PI),
(6.12)
where the first case occurs hen Packet i−1 was dropped with no new
packets inserted, and the second case occurs when a total of l packets
are received either because Packet i − 1 was dropped and there were
l + 1 insertions or Packet i was received and there were l insertions.
For the first Packet 0, we initialize d0 = 0.
Combining (6.10) and (6.11), and given i′ = i+ di, we have
yi+di =

ki w.p. ((1− f)(1− Ps) + fPs) (1− Pd(1− PI)) ,
ki ⊕ 1 w.p. (f(1− Ps) + (1− f)Ps) (1− Pd(1− PI)) ,
x′i−1 ⊕ ki w.p. ((1− f)(1− Ps) + fPs)P (1− PI) ,
x′i−1 ⊕ ki ⊕ 1 w.p. (f(1− Ps) + (1− f)Ps)Pd (1− PI) .
(6.13)
Equation (6.13) captures the HMM with hidden states as (x′i, di), i =
1, 2, · · ·N and observation states as yN ′ , which can be depicted by Fig-
ure 6.8. The state transition probabilities P
(
yi−1+dii−1+di−1 , x
′
i, di|x′i−1, di−1
)
can
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be derived using (6.11), (6.12) and (6.13), summarized as
P
(
yi−1+dii−1+di−1 , x
′
i, di|x′i−1, di−1
)
=
(1− f)Pd(1− PI) if x′i = x′i−1 ⊕ ki, di = di−1 − 1 and yi−1+dii−1+di−1 = ∅,
fPd(1− PI) if x′i = x′i−1 ⊕ ki ⊕ 1, di = di−1 − 1 and yi−1+dii−1+di−1 = ∅,
(1− f)(1− Ps)(1− PI)(PdP l+1I + (1− Pd)P lI)
if x′i = ki, di = di−1 + l and yi−1+di−1 = x
′
i−1,
f(1− Ps)(1− PI)(PdP l+1I + (1− Pd)P lI)
if x′i = ki ⊕ 1, di = di−1 + l and yi−1+di−1 = x′i−1,
(1− f)Ps(1− PI)(PdP l+1I + (1− Pd)P lI)
if x′i = ki, di = di−1 + l and yi−1+di−1 = x
′
i−1 ⊕ 1,
fPs(1− PI)(PdP l+1I + (1− Pd)P lI)
if x′i = ki ⊕ 1, di = di−1 + l and yi−1+di−1 = x′i−1 ⊕ 1.
(6.14)
For example, after sending Packet i−1, the system state is (x′i−1, di−1). If
Packet i − 1 is lost and no packets are inserted, then from (6.12), the drift
of Packet i becomes di = di−1 − 1, and no new bit is decoded, i.e., yi−1+dii−1+di−1
is an empty sequence. Additionally, the IPD between Packet i and i − 1 is
added to previously merged IPDs such that x′i is decided based on the last
two cases in (6.11). Overall, the transition probability in this scenario is
given by
P
(∅, x′i, di−1 − 1|x′i−1, di−1) =
(1− f)Pd(1− PI) if x′i = x′i−1 ⊕ ki,fPd(1− PI) if x′i = x′i−1 ⊕ ki ⊕ 1.
(6.15)
6.2.5 Forward-Backward Algorithm
For the HMM in Figure 6.8, we apply the forward-backward algorithm to
derive the posterior probabilities P (yN
′ |wj), j = 1, 2, · · · , n. Define the for-
ward quantity as the joint probability of bits yi−1+di1 decoded before sending
Packet i at the hidden state of (x′i, di), which is given by
Fi(x
′
i, di) = P (y
i−1+di
1 , x
′
i, di), i = 1, 2, · · · , N. (6.16)
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The forward quantities can be computed recursively using transition proba-
bilities in (6.14) as
Fi(x
′
i, di) =
∑
x′i−1,
di−1
Fi−1(x′i−1, di−1)P (y
i−1+di
i−1+di−1 , x
′
i, di|x′i−1, di−1).
(6.17)
Similarly, we define the backward quantity as the conditional probability
of decoding the rest of the bits in the received flow, yN
′
i+di
, given the current
state (x′i, di),
Bi(x
′
i, di) = P (y
N ′
i+di
|x′i, di), i = 1, 2, · · · , N. (6.18)
The backward quantities can also be computed recursively as
Bi(x
′
i, di) =
∑
x′i+1,
di+1
P (y
i+di+1
i+di
, x′i+1, di+1|x′i, di)Bi+1(x′i+1, di+1).
(6.19)
Given the forward/backward quantities, the posterior likelihood of the
watermark bit wj is given by
P
(
yN
′ |wj
)
= P
(
yN
′|w˜js(j−1)s+1
)
=
∑
x′
(j−1)s,x
′
js,
d(j−1)s,djs
F(j−1)s
(
x′(j−1)s, d(j−1)s
)
Fˆjs
(
x′js, djs)Bjs(x
′
js, djs
)
,
(6.20)
where the first equality follows from our watermark sparsification function
in (6.1), and the quantity F ′js(xi, di) is defined as
Fˆjs(x
′
i, di) = P
(
yi−1+di(j−1)s+d(j−1)s , x
′
i, di|x′(j−1)s, d(j−1)s, w˜js(j−1)s+1
)
, (6.21)
for (j − 1)s+ 1 ≤ i ≤ js.
The quantity F ′js(x
′
i, di) can be calculated recursively as
Fˆjs(x
′
i, di) =
∑
x′i−1,
di−1
Fˆjs(x
′
i−1, di−1)P
(
yi−1+dii−1+di−1 , x
′
i, di|x′i−1, di−1, w˜js(j−1)s+1)
)
,
(6.22)
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where P
(
yi−1+dii−1+di−1 , x
′
i, di|x′i−1, di−1, w˜js(j−1)s+1)
)
is given by
P
(
yi−1+dii−1+di−1 , x
′
i, di|x′i−1, di−1, w˜js(j−1)s+1)
)
=
Pd(1− PI) if di = di−1 − 1 and x′i = w˜i ⊕ ki ⊕ x′i−1, and yi−1+dii−1+di−1 = ∅,
Ps(1− PI)
(
PdP
di−di−1+1
I + (1− Pd)P di−di−1I
)
if di ≥ di−1, x′i = w˜i ⊕ ki and yi−1+di−1 = x′i−1 ⊕ 1,
(1− Ps)(1− PI)
(
PdP
di−di−1+1
I + (1− Pd)P di−di−1I
)
if di ≥ di−1, x′i = w˜i ⊕ ki and yi−1+di−1 = x′i−1.
(6.23)
Once the posterior probabilities for all watermark bits are calculated, the
watermark sequence, wˆn can be estimated using the maximum likelihood rule
of (6.7). Finally, the presence of the watermark in a flow is decided based
on the correlation value of the estimated watermark, wˆn, and the original
watermark sequence, wn.
6.3 Evaluation
We tested our scheme for real SSH traces of length 2000 collected in the
CAIDA database with an average rate of 0.865 pps [92], which represent typ-
ical traffic in human-involved network connections, where flow watermarks
are most applicable. For the tests in this section, we fixed the watermark
parameters to {∆ = 100 ms, n = 50, s = 10}.
6.3.1 Robustness Tests
From the experimental results in [38], the standard deviation of the Laplacian
jitter is estimated as σ = 10 ms. We performed tests with σ varied over
{10, 20, 30, 40}ms. The packet drop and split probabilities were Pd = 0.1
and PI = 0, respectively. We watermarked 1000 flows from both synthetic
and SSH traces.
The true positive (TP) rates are given in Table 6.1. Notice that the wa-
termarks were detected with accuracies over 98%, even when jitter was as
high as 20 ms. The detection performance falls sharply when jitter standard
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Table 6.1: True positive rates under varying IPD jitter with false positive
rates below 1%.
Jitter Std. Dev. (ms) 10 20 30 40
TP 1.000 0.989 0.652 0.193
Table 6.2: True positive rates for varying PI ,Pd with false positive rates
below 1%.
Pi,Pd 1%,1% 5%,5% 10%,10%
TP 1.000 1.000 0.662
deviations exceeds 40 ms. However, such excessively large jitter rarely occurs
at proper network conditions. Hence, our scheme withstands network jitter
in normal operating conditions.
One major improvement of our design over previous work is robustness
against packet deletion and insertion. To verify this, we tested our scheme
in a network with deletion and insertion with (Pd, PI) taking values from
{(0.01, 0.01), (0.05, 0.05), (0.1, 0.1), (0.15, 0.15)}. During all the tests, the
standard deviation of jitter was fixed as σ = 10 ms, and 1000 flows from
both synthetic and SSH traces were used.
The results in Tables 6.2 demonstrate watermarks were detected with high
accuracies when 5% of packets were dropped and inserted.
6.3.2 Visibility Tests
We first evaluated watermark invisibility with two tests: the Kolmogorov-
Simirnov (KS) test and the multiflow attack (MFA) test.
KS test is commonly applied to comparing distributions of data sets. Given
two data sets, the KS distance is computed as the maximum difference of their
empirical distribution functions [93]. For two flows A and B, the KS distance
is given by sup
x
(|FA(x) − FB(x)|), where FA(x) and FB(x) are the empirical
pdfs of IPDs in A and B. We claim two flows are indistinguishable if their
KS distance is below 0.036, a threshold suggested in [93]. We calculated the
average KS distance between watermarked and unwatermarked flows. The
results are tabulated in Table 6.3. None of the KS distances exceed the
detection threshold of visibility, which implies the embedded watermarks did
not cause noticeable artifacts in the original packet flows.
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Table 6.3: Average KS distances between watermarked and unwatermarked
traces.
PPPPPPPPPn
∆ (ms)
100 80 60
30 0.0091 0.0081 0.0071
40 0.0120 0.0111 0.0091
50 0.0158 0.0139 0.0123
Table 6.4: Statistics of blank intervals in the aggregated flow.
Watermarked Unwatermarked
Mean 403 395.67
Standard Deviation 20.54 16.84
MFA is a watermark attack that detects positions of embedded water-
marks in interval-based schemes, When flows which were watermarked using
the same watermark are aggregated, the aggregate flow shows a number of
intervals containing no packets (see Figure 10 in [37]). To test whether such
“visible” pattern exists in flows watermarked using our scheme, we combined
10 watermarked and 10 unwatermarked flows for both the synthetic and SSH
traces, and divided the aggregated flows into intervals with length of length
of 70 ms. We then counted the number of blank intervals with no packets in
each aggregate flow. This procedure was repeated 1000 times, and the result-
ing blank interval statistics are shown in Table 6.4. We see that the number
of blank intervals does not change much after watermarks were embedded.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
Two timing channels were studied in the context of traffic analysis. We
first studied the timing side channel in shared schedulers, where information
leakage occurs due to the sharing of queue among users. We demonstrated
privacy threats brought by such a side channel with both real-world attack
and theoretic analysis. Our experiments on real DSL links showed that an
attacker was able to obtain sufficient information for inferring a user’s com-
munication details by frequently probing the user’s DSL router. Our informa-
tion theoretic analysis showed that deterministic work-conserving schedulers
always leak substantial information through timing side channels. Addition-
ally, we exploited the usage of such a channel for covert communication by
studying a timing covert channel, where one user encodes a message in job
arrival times and the other user decodes this message from job queueing de-
lays. Following conventions in information and coding theory, we derived the
channel capacities for commonly used scheduling policies.
We subsequently studied the timing stenographic channel in flow water-
marking. By actively embedding an “invisible” watermark in packet times,
it is possible to stealthily track a user’s flow in an anonymous network, and
thus break the anonymity. However, it was often hard to reliably decode
such watermarks as packets can get dropped or split. We modeled flow wa-
termarking as a timing stenographic channel with insertion, deletion and
substitution errors, and developed a reliable watermark decoding scheme in
face of network jitter, packet loss and packet split.
We list some directions worthy to study further in the next step as follows:
1. Policy-design-based mitigation techniques: The fundamental rea-
son for the existence of timing side and covert channels in common
schedulers is that the scheduler is designed to service jobs in a de-
lay/throughput optimal way. Delay optimal policies never idle as long
as there are jobs in the queue. As a result, an attacker is often able
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to recover accurate information about the queue state, and hence the
other user’s behavior. This might not be the case, if the scheduler in-
tentionally adds idling slots, or randomizes the service order of jobs to
some extent. It is worthy to study the design of policies that guarantee
certain levels of privacy for the user while maintaining sufficiently high
quality of service (QoS).
2. Effect of job sizes: In our model in Section 4.1, we consider the job
sizes of users are the same. This is practical for network systems, where
the limit on packet sizes is often pre-fixed by the application proto-
col [94]. In [95], the information leakage of work-conserving schedulers
was characterized for an attacker that could issue infinitesimally small
jobs. In that scenario, it was shown that round robin is a privacy-
optimal work-conserving policy. In the next step, it would be interest-
ing to extensively investigate the role of job size in the performances
of timing channels in shared schedulers.
3. Identifying the best attack strategies: Recall our definition in (4.1).
It is clear that in order to derive the information leakage of a specific
scheduling policy, we need to find the strongest attacker, who opti-
mally utilizes his observations to learn the maximum possible infor-
mation about the other process. Currently, we have found the best
attacks against the LQF and FCFS schedulers. For round robin, we
only obtained a lower bound on the information leakage based on the
nonstop monitoring attack strategy. To derive the exact expression of
information leakage under such a policy, it is necessary to gauge its
performance against the strongest attacker.
4. Timing covert channel with feedback: In our timing covert chan-
nel in Section 5.1, the sender does not make use of the departure times
of his jobs to assist the encoding procedure. It will be interesting to
study the change in the channel performance when the sender adapts
his actions based on observed job departure times. This is similar to
partial state feedback at the encoder which can improve the capacity or
the error exponent (the rate of convergence to zero error probability).
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS OF CHAPTER 4
A.1 Proof of Theorem 4.3.1
Before proving Theorem 4.3.1, we introduce two lemmas.
Define function Hλ: Z+ → R ∪ {+∞} as
Hλ(i) = H
(
δ1, δ2, · · · , δi
∣∣∣ i∑
j=1
δj
)
, (A.1)
where δi’s are i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables.
Lemma A.1.1. Hλ(·) is a mid-point convex function [81, (2.8)]; i.e.,
Hλ(a) +Hλ(b) ≥ Hλ
(⌊
a+ b
2
⌋)
+Hλ
(⌈
a+ b
2
⌉)
, (A.2)
for all a ≤ b, a, b ∈ Z+, and the equality is achieved if b = a or b = a+ 1.
Proof. Given m,n ∈ Z+, m ≥ n, we compute
Hλ(m)−Hλ (n) =H
(
δn, δmn+1
∣∣∣ m∑
i=1
δi
)
−H
(
δn
∣∣∣ n∑
i=1
δi
)
(a)
=H
(
δmn+1
∣∣∣ m∑
i=1
δi
)
+H
(
δn
∣∣∣δmn+1, m∑
i=1
δi
)
−H
(
δn
∣∣∣ n∑
i=1
δi
)
(b)
=H
(
δmn+1
∣∣∣ m∑
i=1
δi
)
(c)
=H
(
δm−n
∣∣∣ m∑
i=1
δi
)
,
(A.3)
where (a) applies the entropy chain rule [75, Theorem 2.2.1], (b) holds because
that
∑n
i=1 δi is a sufficient statistic to infer δ
n and can be calculated from
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δmn+1 and
∑m
i=1 δi, and (c) follows from the fact that Bernoulli arrivals are
uniformly distributed once the total number of arrivals is known.
Replacing (m,n) with
(
b,
⌈
a+b
2
⌉)
and
(⌊
a+b
2
⌋
, a
)
in (A.3), respectively, we
get
Hλ(b)−Hλ
(⌈
a+ b
2
⌉)
= H
(
δba+b2 c−a
∣∣∣ b∑
i=1
δi
)
(A.4)
and
Hλ
(⌊
a+ b
2
⌋)
−Hλ (a) = H
δba+b2 c−a∣∣∣ ba+b2 c∑
i=1
δi
 . (A.5)
Subtracting (A.5) from (A.4), we get
Hλ(b) +Hλ (a)−Hλ
(⌈
a+ b
2
⌉)
−Hλ
(⌊
a+ b
2
⌋)
= H
(
δba+b2 c−a
∣∣∣ b∑
i=1
δi
)
−H
δba+b2 c−a∣∣∣ ba+b2 c∑
i=1
δi

(d)
= H
(
δba+b2 c−a
∣∣∣ b∑
i=1
δi
)
− H
δba+b2 c−a∣∣∣ ba+b2 c∑
i=1
δi,
b∑
i=1
δi

= I
δba+b2 c−a; ba+b2 c∑
i=1
δi
∣∣∣ b∑
i=1
δi
 ≥ 0,
(A.6)
where (d) follows from that fact that
∑b
i=ba+b2 c+1 δi does not provide extra
information to infer δba+b2 c−a. Clearly, the last inequality turns equality if
b = a or a+ 1, which completes the proof.
Lemma A.1.2. Hλ(·) is an integrally convex function [81, (2.5)]; i.e., it can
be extended to a globally convex function Hˆλ: R+ → R ∪ {+∞}, where
Hˆλ(x) = αxHλ(bxc) + (1− αx)Hλ(dxe), (A.7)
where αx =
d 1xe− 1x
d 1xe−b 1xc .
Proof. Applying Lemma A.1.1, this is a direct result from [81, Theorem 2.4],
which states that a discrete function satisfying mid-point convexity can be
extended to a convex continuous function through linear interpolation.
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Proof of Theorem 4.3.1: The entropy of the sampled process satisfies
H (N (A1) , · · · , N (Ak)) (a)= I
(
δAk−1;N (A1) , N (A2) , · · · , N (Ak)
)
= I
(
δAk−1;N (A2)−N (A1) , · · · , N (Ak)−N (Ak−1)
)
(b)
= H
(
δAk−1
)− k−1∑
i=1
H
(
δ
Ai+1−1
Ai
∣∣N (Ai+1)−N (Ai)) ,
(A.8)
where (a) follows from that N(Ai)’s are functions of δ and (b) applies the
entropy chain rule.
Define nr to be the number of elements in the sequence {A2−A1, · · · , Ak−
Ak−1} that take the value of r, then
∑∞
r=1 nr = k. The conditional entropy
in (A.8) can be rewritten as
k−1∑
i=1
H
(
δ
Ai+1−1
Ai
∣∣N (Ai+1)−N (Ai)) = ∞∑
r=1
nrH
δr∣∣ r∑
j=1
δj

=
∞∑
r=1
nrHλ(r)
(c)
=
∞∑
r=1
nrHˆλ(r),
(A.9)
where function Hλ(·) and Hˆλ(·) are defined according to (A.1) and (A.7),
respectively, and (c) holds because Hλ(·) and Hˆλ(·) take the same values for
integer arguments.
Combining (A.8) and (A.9), the entropy rate of the sampled process is
upper-bounded as given by
lim
k→∞
H (N (A1) , · · · , N (Ak))
k
= ωH(δ1)− lim
k→∞
∑∞
r=1 nrHˆλ(r)
k
(d)
≤ ωH(δ1)− lim
k→∞
Hˆλ
(∑∞
r=1 nrr
k
)
≤ ωH(δ1)− Hˆλ
(
lim
k→∞
∑∞
r=1 nrr
k
)
(e)
= ωH(δ1)− Hˆλ
(
1
ω
)
(f)
= αωH
b
1
ωc∑
i=1
δi
+ (1− αω)H
d
1
ωe∑
i=1
δi
 ,
(A.10)
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where (d) applies Jensen’s inequality [96, (9.1.3.1)], (e) follows from ω =
lim
k→∞
k
Ak
, and (f) follows from (A.1) and (A.7).
Finally, it is easy to verify that the sampled process by the periodic-
sampling strategy has the same entropy rate as given by the bound in (A.10),
which completes the proof for (4.12).
A.2 Proof Achievability of Theorem 4.3.2
For the achievability of (4.13) in Theorem 4.3.2, we need to prove
LFCFS(λ) ≥ (1− λ)
α1−λH
b 11−λc∑
i=1
δi
+ (1− α1−λ)H
d 11−λe∑
i=1
δi

 .
Proof. Let D∗ = {D∗1, D∗2, · · · } denote the departure times of the attacker’s
jobs applying the periodic sampling attack strategy defined in (4.11). We
have a lower bound on the information leakage as
LFCFS(λ) ≥ max
A∗: lim
k→∞
k
A∗
k
<1−λ
lim
n→∞
I (δn; A∗m,D∗m)
n
. (A.11)
Rewrite the mutual information in (A.11) as follows:
I (δn; A∗m,D∗m)
(a)
= I (δn; A∗m, q (A∗1) , q (A
∗
2) , · · · , q (A∗m))
(b)
= I (δn; A∗m,X∗m)− I (δn; A∗m,X∗m∣∣A∗m, q (A∗1) , · · · , q (A∗m))
= I (δn; A∗m,X∗m)−H (X∗m∣∣A∗m, q (A∗1) , · · · , q (A∗m))
(c)
= H
(
X∗m
∣∣A∗m)−H (X∗m∣∣A∗m, q (A∗1) , · · · , q (A∗m)) ,
(A.12)
where (a) follows from (4.8), X∗k is the total number of the user’s jobs that
have arrived between the times A∗k−1 and A
∗
k, (b) follows from the Markov
chain in (4.16), and (c) holds because A∗m is independent of δn.
Substituting (A.12) into (A.11), we have
LFCFS(λ) ≥ max
ω:ω<1−λ
ω lim
m→∞
H
(
X∗m
∣∣A∗m)−H (X∗m∣∣A∗m, q (A∗1) , · · · , q (A∗m))
m
.
(A.13)
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Applying the entropy chain rule to the second term in (A.13), we have
lim
m→∞
H
(
X∗m
∣∣A∗m, q (A∗1) , · · · , q (A∗m))
m
= lim
m→∞
∑m
k=1 H
(
X∗k
∣∣X∗k−1,A∗m, q (A∗1) , · · · , q (A∗m))
m
(d)
= lim
m→∞
∑m
k=1H
(
X∗k
∣∣A∗k − A∗k−1, q (A∗k−1) , q (A∗k))
m
,
(A.14)
where (d) follows from the update equation of queue length seen by the
attacker’s jobs, which is given by
q (A∗k) =
(
q
(
A∗k−1
)
+ 1 +X∗k −
(
A∗k − A∗k−1
))
+
. (A.15)
It can be shown that
{
A∗k − A∗k−1, q
(
A∗k−1
)
, q (A∗k)
}
, k ∈ Z forms a posi-
tive recurrent Markov chain (see Appendix A.3 for the proof), which implies
the equivocation rate in (A.14) converges as k → ∞, with the limit deter-
mined by the stationary distribution of
{
A∗k − A∗k−1, q
(
A∗k−1
)
, q (A∗k)
}
. Let
{T , Q1, Q2} take the stationary distribution of
{
A∗k − A∗k−1, q
(
A∗k−1
)
, q (A∗k)
}
.
From the Cesa`ro mean theorem [75, Theorem 4.2.3], (A.14) can be rewritten
as
lim
m→∞
H
(
X∗m
∣∣A∗m, q (A∗1) , · · · , q (A∗m))
m
= H (X|T , Q1, Q2) . (A.16)
Furthermore, it can be shown that as ω → 1−λ, Q2 is always positive (see
Appendix A.2.1), i.e.,
lim
ω→1−λ
P (Q2 = 0) = 0. (A.17)
From the queue length update equation, Q2 = (Q1 + 1 + X − T )+, we know
that X is always deterministic as Q2 −Q1 + T − 1, i.e.,
H (X|T , Q1, Q2 > 0) = 0. (A.18)
Equations (A.17) and (A.18) imply that
lim
ω→1−λ
H (X|T , Q1, Q2) = 0. (A.19)
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Substituting (A.16) into (A.13) and applying (A.19), we have
LFCFS(λ) ≥ max
ω:ω<1−λ
ω
(
lim
m→∞
H
(
X∗m
∣∣A∗m)
m
−H (X|T , Q1, Q2)
)
≥ lim
ω→1−λ
ω
(
lim
m→∞
H
(
X∗m
∣∣A∗m)
m
−H (X|T , Q1, Q2)
)
= lim
ω→1−λ
ω lim
m→∞
H
(
X∗m
∣∣A∗m)
m
.
(A.20)
Since X∗i ’s are i.i.d. Binomial(A
∗
i − A∗i−1, λ) random variables, we have
lim
m→∞
H
(
X∗m
∣∣A∗m)
m
= αωH
b 1ωc∑
i=1
δi
+ (1− αω)H
d 1ωe∑
i=1
δi
 . (A.21)
Substituting (A.21) into (A.20) proves (A.11).
A.2.1 Proof of (A.17)
Recall that T is distributed as (4.11), X is Binomial(T , λ), and Q1 and Q2
have identical distribution satisfying
Q2 = (Q1 + 1 + X − T )+ . (A.22)
We need to prove that lim
ω→1−λ
P (Q2 = 0) = 0.
Proof. Based on (4.11), (A.22) can be rewritten as
Q2 =
(
Q1 + Y −
⌈
1
ω
⌉)
+
, (A.23)
where
Y =
2 +X1 w.p. αω1 +X ′1 w.p. 1− αω , (A.24)
whereX1 ∼ Binomial
(⌊
1
ω
⌋
, λ
)
, X ′1 ∼ Binomial
(⌈
1
ω
⌉
, λ
)
, and αω =
d 1ωe− 1ω
d 1ωe−b 1ωc .
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Taking the z-transform of Q2, we have
Q(z) =
∑d 1ωe−2
k=0
∑d 1ωe−2−k
r=0 pkur
(
zd 1ωe−1 − zk+r
)
zd 1ωe−1 − Y(z)
, (A.25)
where Y(z) is the z-transform of Y as given by
Y(z) = αωz(1− λ+ λz)d 1ωe + (1− αω)z2(1− λ+ λz)b 1ωc, (A.26)
and pk = P (Q2 = k) and ur = P (Y = r).
Substituting (A.26) into (A.25) and letting z = 1 on both sides, we have
d 1ωe−2∑
k=0
d 1ωe−2−r∑
r=0
ur
(⌈
1
ω
⌉
− 1− k − r
) = ⌈ 1
ω
⌉
(1− ω − λ) . (A.27)
Dropping the terms with r > 1 on the left-hand side, we further get
u1
(⌈
1
ω
⌉
− 1− k
) d 1ωe−2∑
k=0
pk ≤
⌈
1
ω
⌉
(1− ω − λ) . (A.28)
Plugging in the values of u1 and taking the limit as ω → 1− λ, we have
lim
ω→1−λ
d 1ωe−2∑
k=0
pk ≤ lim
ω→1−λ
⌈
1
ω
⌉
(1− ω − λ)
(1− αω)
(
1− λd 1ωe
) = 0, (A.29)
which readily implies p0 = 0, which is the desired result.
A.3 Queuing Analysis of the FCFS Scheduler
Theorem A.3.1. In an FCFS scheduler with total job arrival rate below 1,
when the attacker applies the periodic-sampling strategy defined in (4.11),{
A∗k − A∗k−1, q
(
A∗k−1
)
, q (A∗k)
}
, k ∈ Z, forms a positive recurrent Markov
chain.
Proof. We first prove that the chain, {q (A∗k)}, k ∈ Z, is a positive recurrent.
The Markovian property directly follows from the FCFS policy and memo-
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ryless property of the user’s arrival process; given the queue length at Ak,
future queue states are independent with the past arrival history. We show
the ergodicity using a linear Lyapunov function defined as
V (q (A∗k)) = q (A
∗
k) , k ∈ Z. (A.30)
Recall that the arrival rates of the user and attacker are denoted by λ and
ω, respectively. If q (A∗k) ≥
⌈
1
ω
⌉
, the scheduler is guaranteed to be busy from
A∗k to A
∗
k+1. Hence, from (A.15),
q (A∗k+1) = q (A∗k) + 1 +X∗k −
(
A∗k+1 − A∗k
)
. (A.31)
As X∗k has mean as
λ
ω
, and A∗k+1−A∗k has mean as 1ω , the drift of the Lyapunov
function in this case is given by
PV (q (A∗k))− V (q (A∗k)) = −
1− ω − λ
ω
. (A.32)
Additionally, during [A∗k, A
∗
k+1), the buffer queue length can grow at most
1, so the drift is bounded by
PV (q (A∗k))− V (q (A∗k)) ≤ 1. (A.33)
Combining (A.32) and (A.33), the drift in any queue state is bound by
PV (q (A∗k))− V (q (A∗k)) ≤ −+ 1{q(A∗k)<d 1ωe}, (A.34)
where  = 1−ω−λ
ω
. Following Foster-Lyapunov stability [97, Theorem 5],
(A.34) implies the Markov chain {q (A∗k)}, k ∈ Z, is positive recurrent.
For the same reason we argue for the Markovian property of {q (A∗k)},
k ∈ Z, {A∗k − A∗k−1, q (A∗k−1) , q (A∗k)}, k ∈ Z, also form a Markov chain.
Additionally, a stationary distribution of
{
A∗k − A∗k−1, q
(
A∗k−1
)
, q (A∗k)
}
, k ∈
Z, can be derived from the stationary distribution of {q (A∗k)} and (4.11).
The existence of the stationary distribution implies that the Markov chain,{
A∗k − A∗k−1, q
(
A∗k−1
)
, q (A∗k)
}
, k ∈ Z, is positive recurrent [98, Definition 3.1].
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A.4 Busy Period Distribution in the Round Robin
Scheduler
Consider a round-robin scheduler serving a user and an attacker. The user
sends jobs according to a Bernoulli arrival process with rate λ ≤ 0.5, and
the attacker applies the nonstop monitoring attack, where the arrival and
departure times satisfy (4.5). We prove the busy periods seen by the attacker,
Bi’s as defined in (4.23), are i.i.d. distributed as (4.25) and have mean
E [Bi] = lim
n→∞
∑n
i=1Bi
n
=
1
1− 2λ. (A.35)
Proof. Write the update equation of queue lengths seen by the attacker as
q (Ak+1) =
(
q (Ak) + 1 +
Ak+1∑
i=Ak+1
δi − (Ak+1 − Ak)
)
+
, (A.36)
for k ∈ Z.
Following from (4.5) and (4.22), we have
Ak+1 − Ak =
1 if q (Ak) = 0,2 if q (Ak) > 0. (A.37)
Given (A.36) and (A.37), we can draw a Markov chain formed by {q (Ak)},
k ∈ Z, as depicted by Figure A.1. The length of busy period Bi is simply
a function of the number of transitions, s, it takes to return back to state 0
(starting from state 0), as given by
Bi = 2s− 1, i ∈ Z. (A.38)
Clearly, s has the same pmf with Bi’s.
From the Markov chain in Figure A.1, we know
P(s = 1) = 1− λ. (A.39)
For s = 2, the queue length first needs a jump to state 1, and then returns
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Figure A.1: The Markov chain of queue length when attacking the round
robin scheduler with the nonstop monitoring strategy.
to state 0, which has the probability as
P(s = 2) = λ(1− λ)2. (A.40)
For s > 2, after jumping to state 1 for first time, the queue state needs
to experience another s − 2 transitions before returning to state 1 for the
last time and eventually returning back to state 0. Notice that each state
transition either increases the queue length by 1, decreases the queue length
by 1, or keeps the queue length unchanged. Therefore, the s−2 intermediate
transitions must contain the same number of transitions that increase and
decrease the queue length. Moreover, the increase in the queue length must
always lead the decrease; otherwise, the queue would return to state 0 before
the required number of transitions finish. Define Ws,j to be the total ways of
s − 2 transitions with j transitions increasing the queue (also j transitions
decreasing the queue). Then Ws,j =
(
s−2
2j
)
Cj, where Cj is the famous Catalan
number as given by
Cj =
1
j + 1
(
2j
j
)
. (A.41)
The transition probability for s > 2 can be calculated as
P(s = r) = λ(1− λ)2
b r−22 c∑
j=1
Wr,j (2(1− λ)λ)r−2−2j (1− λ)2jλ2j
= 2r−1λr−1(1− λ)r
b r−22 c∑
j=1
(r − 2)!2−2j−1
(r − 2− 2j)!j!(j + 1)! .
(A.42)
Equations (A.38), (A.39), (A.40), and (A.42) together imply (4.25).
In each busy period, the number of queue state transitions equals to the
number of attacker’s job arrivals. Since the attacker’s arrival rate in this
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nonstop-monitoring attack is 1 − λ, thus E[ s
Bi
] = 1− λ, which together
with (A.38) imply (A.35).
A.5 Busy Period Distribution in the WC-TDMA
Scheduler
Consider a WC-TDMA scheduler serving a user and an attacker, where even
and odd time slots are reserved to the attacker and user, respectively. The
user sends jobs according to the Bernoulli arrival process with rate λ ≤ 0.5,
and the attacker sends jobs on all odd slots according to (4.30). We prove
the busy periods seen by the attacker, B′i’s as defined in (4.32), are i.i.d.
distributed as (4.25) and have mean
E [B′i] =
2− 2λ
1− 2λ, for i ∈ Z. (A.43)
Proof. Based on (4.30) and the queue update equation (A.36), the evolving
of queue state, {q (Ak)}, k ∈ Z, can be described by the same Markov chain
depicted in Figure A.1, and the busy period B′i is nothing but a function of
the number of transitions, s, it takes to return to state 0 starting from state
0, which is given by
B′i = 2s, i ∈ Z. (A.44)
Using the same arguments in our proof of (4.25) in Appendix A.4, it is
clear that B′i’s are distributed as (4.25). Additionally, following from (A.38),
(A.44), and (A.35),
E [B′i] = E [Bi] + 1 =
2− 2λ
1− 2λ. (A.45)
A.6 Proof of (4.40)
We need to prove that
lim
λ→0
P (q (Sk) = 0) = 1, k ∈ Z, (A.46)
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where Sk = max{Ak, Dk−1}.
Proof. We prove this by induction. The base case is straightforward, con-
sidering the queue length starts with zero, i.e., q (S1) = 0. Now assume it
is true that lim
λ→0
P (q(Sk) = 0) = 1, for k = 1, 2, · · · , r. Consider the update
equation of queue length, as given by
q (Sr+1) =
(
q (Sr) + 1 +
Sr+1−1∑
i=Sr
δi − (Sr+1 − Sr)
)
+
, (A.47)
from which we calculate the probability of empty queue as given by
lim
λ→0
P (q (Sr+1) = 0)
= lim
λ→0
Sr+1−Sr−1∑
i=0
P (q (Sr) = i) ·
Sr+1−Sr−1−i∑
j=0
(
Sr+1 − Sr
j
)
(1− λ)Sr+1−Sr−jλj
(a)
= lim
λ→0
Sr+1−Sr−1∑
j=0
(
Sr+1 − Sr
j
)
(1− λ)Sr+1−Sr−jλj
= 1− lim
λ→0
λSr+1−Sr
= 1,
(A.48)
where (a) follows from the assumption that lim
λ→0
P (q(Sk) = 0) = 1. This
completes the proof.
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APPENDIX B
PROOFS OF CHAPTER 5
In this appendix, we study the function h : Z× R→ R defined as
h (k, µ) = sup
X∈{0,1,··· ,k}
E[X]=kµ, 0<µ<1
H (X) .
(B.1)
B.1 The Optimal Distribution of X
Theorem B.1.1. Let X be a random variable taking values in {0, 1, · · · , k}
with mean kµ, and let X¯ be a random variable with the same mean as X and
pdf as
P
(
X¯ = i
)
= ris, i = 0, 1, · · · , k, (B.2)
where
∑k
i=0 r
is = 1 and
∑k
i=0 ir
is = kµ. Then
H (X) ≤ H (X¯) . (B.3)
Proof. Denote the pdf of X by p(i), i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , k} and the pdf of X¯ by
q(i), i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , k}. The Kullback Leibler (KL) distance [75, p.18] between
X and X¯ is defined as
D (p||q) =
k∑
i=0
p(i) log
p(x)
q(x)
=
k∑
i=0
p(i) log p(i)−
k∑
i=0
p(i)i log r −
k∑
i=0
p(i) log s
= −H(X)− kµ log r − log s.
(B.4)
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Figure B.1: Concavity of h(k, µ).
Since the KL distance is non-negative, we have
H(X) ≤ −µ log r − log s, (B.5)
where the equality is achieved when X has the same distribution as X¯. This
completes the proof.
B.2 Properties of h(k, µ)
Proposition B.2.1. The function h(k, µ) defined in (B.1) is a concave func-
tion of both k and µ.
To show the concavity on µ, we fix the value of k and plot the function
h(k, µ) in Figure B.1(a). Similarly, we can verify the concavity on k from
Figure B.1(b), where we plot h(k, µ) fixing the value of µ.
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